Can the Internal Control System Deal with Executive Corruption: An Empirical Study on State-owned Listed Companies

CHI Guo-hua; ZHU Jun-qing

Volume 34 Issue 1

May 2021

Turn off MathJax

Article Contents

Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2019 > 34(1): 46-59

CHI Guo-hua, ZHU Jun-qing. Can the Internal Control System Deal with Executive Corruption: An Empirical Study on State-owned Listed Companies[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(1): 46-59.

Citation:

CHI Guo-hua, ZHU Jun-qing. Can the Internal Control System Deal with Executive Corruption: An Empirical Study on State-owned Listed Companies[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(1): 46-59.

Citation:

PDF( 1076 KB)

Can the Internal Control System Deal with Executive Corruption: An Empirical Study on State-owned Listed Companies

School of Accounting, Dongbei University of Finance and Economics, Dalian 116025, China

Received Date: 2018-09-25
Available Online: 2021-05-31
Publish Date: 2019-01-28

Abstract

Abstract

Traditionally, institutional anti-corruption aims to achieve "non-corruption" by restraining power. Is there any other corruption governance mechanism? Taking the state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2012 as the research sample and taking the essence of internal control as the theoretical basis, this paper makes an empirical analysis on whether there are governance mechanisms of "not daring to corrupt" and "not wanting to corrupt" through self-control. The empirical results show that: internal control can suppress selfish desire through rigid governance mechanism to achieve "not daring to corrupt"; it can guide selfish desire through flexible governance mechanism to achieve "not wanting to corrupt". The above mechanisms are determined by the essence of internal control: "supervision" and "motivation", while the mechanism of "not being able to corrupt" is determined by the essence of check and balance.
- internal control,
- internal management system,
- selfish desires,
- corruption governance,
- "not daring to corrupt",
- "not wanting to corrupt",
- executive,
- corruption

FullText(HTML)

References(56)

References

[1]	徐细雄, 刘星. 放权改革、薪酬管制与企业高管腐败[J]. 管理世界, 2013(3): 119-132. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GLSJ201303013.htm
[2]	FAN, JOSEPH P H, WONG T J, et al. Institutions and organizational structure: the case of state-owned corporate pyramids[J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2013, 29(6): 1217-1252. doi: 10.1093/jleo/ews028
[3]	尹律, 徐光华. 关于行政事业单位内部控制信息披露的探讨——基于国家治理的视角[J]. 审计研究, 2015(4): 74-79. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SJYZ201504014.htm
[4]	DAVIES I, ANDRESKI S. Parasitism and subversion[M]. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1966.
[5]	HUNTINGTON S P. Political order in changing societies[M]. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
[6]	万广华, 吴一平. 制度建设与反腐败成效: 基于跨期腐败程度变化的研究[J]. 管理世界, 2012(4): 60-69. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GLSJ201204005.htm
[7]	黄玖立, 李坤望. 吃喝、腐败与企业订单[J]. 经济研究, 2013(6): 71-84. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ201306007.htm
[8]	DAMANIA R, FREDRIKSSON P G, MANI M. The persistence of corruption and regulatory compliance failures: theory and evidence[J]. Public Choice, 2004, 121(3-4): 363-390. doi: 10.1007/s11127-004-1684-0
[9]	万广华, 吴一平. 司法制度、工资激励与反腐败: 中国案例[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2012(3): 997-1010. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJXU201203011.htm
[10]	南旭光, 孟卫东. 基于入门费的腐败与金融制度研究[J]. 中国软科学, 2008(1): 56-61. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-9753.2008.01.008
[11]	陈丽红, 张龙平, 朱海燕. 国家审计能发挥反腐败作用吗?[J]. 审计研究, 2016(3): 48-55. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SJYZ201603008.htm
[12]	陈刚, 李树. 官员交流、任期与反腐败[J]. 世界经济, 2012(2): 120-142. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SJJJ201202010.htm
[13]	黄寿峰, 郑国梁. 财政透明度对腐败的影响研究——来自中国的证据[J]. 财贸经济, 2015(3): 30-42. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-CMJJ201503004.htm
[14]	李春根, 徐建斌. 中国财政预算透明与地区官员腐败关系研究[J]. 当代财经, 2016(1): 19-28. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-DDCJ201601004.htm
[15]	黄溶冰, 赵谦. 财政分权、审计监督与反腐败成效——来自中国2002~2011年的经验证据[J]. 中南财经政法大学学报, 2015(6): 19-25. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-5230.2015.06.003
[16]	吴一平. 财政分权、腐败与治理[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2008(3): 1045-1060. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJXU200803014.htm
[17]	赵璨, 朱锦余, 曹伟. 高薪能够养廉么?——来自中国国有上市公司的实证证据[J]. 中国会计评论, 2013(4): 491-515.
[18]	WEINGAST B R. The economic role of political institutions: market-preserving federalism and economic development[J]. Journal of Law Economics & Organization, 1995, 11(1): 1-31. http://jleo.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/1/1.citation
[19]	GATTI R, FISMAN R. Decentralization and corruption: evidence across countries?[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2002, 83(3): 325-345. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00158-4
[20]	TREISMAN D. The causes of corruption: a cross-national study[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2000, 76(3): 399-457. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00092-4
[21]	KLITGAARD R. Controlling corruption[M]. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
[22]	公婷. 问责审计与腐败治理[J]. 公共行政评论, 2010(2): 69-84. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-2486.2010.02.005
[23]	马志娟. 腐败治理、政府问责与经济责任审计[J]. 审计研究, 2013(6): 52-56. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SJYZ201306009.htm
[24]	HOUSTON J F, LIN C, MA Y. Media ownership, concentration and corruption in bank lending[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2011, 100(2): 326-350. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.12.003
[25]	过勇. 经济转轨、制度与腐败[M]. 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2007.
[26]	盛宇明. 腐败的经济学分析[J]. 经济研究, 2000(5): 52-59. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ200005005.htm
[27]	胡明霞, 干胜道. 管理层权力、内部控制与高管腐败[J]. 中南财经政法大学学报, 2015(3): 87-93. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-5230.2015.03.012
[28]	杨德明, 赵璨. 内部控制、媒体曝光率与国有企业高管腐败[J]. 财务研究, 2015(5): 66-73. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-CWYJ201505007.htm
[29]	周美华, 林斌, 林东杰. 管理层权力、内部控制与腐败治理[J]. 会计研究, 2016(3): 56-63. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2016.03.008
[30]	牟韶红, 李启航, 陈汉文. 内部控制、产权性质与超额在职消费——基于2007-2014年非金融上市公司的经验研究[J]. 审计研究, 2016(4): 90-98. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SJYZ201604015.htm
[31]	黄群慧. 管理腐败新特征与国有企业改革新阶段[J]. 中国工业经济, 2006(11): 52-59. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GGYY200611006.htm
[32]	YAlAMOV T, BELEV B. Corporate governance: an antidote to corruption-examples/lessons learned in Bulgaria and transition countries[J]. SSRN, 2011. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1791210
[33]	浦兴祖. 试论阻断"公权"与"私欲"的勾连[J]. 政治学研究, 2009(6): 31-37. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-POLI200906006.htm
[34]	FINKELSTEIN S. Power in top management teams: dimensions, measurement, and validation[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1992, 35: 505-538. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10120413
[35]	谭志君. 无限欲望与有限满足——关于犯罪原因的哲学分析[J]. 社会科学, 2004(2): 85-91. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SHKX200402013.htm
[36]	HUANG L J, SNELL R S. Turnaround, corruption and mediocrity: leadership and governance in three state owned enterprises in mainland China[J]. Journal of Business Ethics, 2003, 43(1/2): 111-124. doi: 10.1023/A:1022919418838
[37]	PEARCE C L, MANZ C C, SIMS H P. The roles of vertical and shared leadership in the enactment of executive corruption: implications for research and practice[J]. Leadership Quarterly, 2008, 19(3): 353-359. doi: 10.1016/j.leaqua.2008.03.007
[38]	沈广明. 从欲望的不知餍足到财富增殖的无止境——休谟经济哲学思想探析[J]. 武汉理工大学学报: 社会科学版, 2012(4): 579-583. doi: 10.3963/j.issn.1671-6477.2012.04.019
[39]	陈冬华, 陈信元, 万华林. 国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J]. 经济研究, 2005(2): 92-101. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ200502009.htm
[40]	曹伟, 杨德明, 赵璨. 政治晋升预期与高管腐败——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J]. 经济学动态, 2016(2): 59-77. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJXD201602008.htm
[41]	谢志华. 内部控制: 本质与结构[J]. 会计研究, 2009(12): 70-75. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2009.12.010
[42]	SIMONS R. How managers use innovative control systems to drive strategic renewal[M]. Boston: Harvard Business Press, 1995.
[43]	张先治. 建立企业内部管理控制系统框架的探讨[J]. 财经问题研究, 2003(11): 67-71. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-176X.2003.11.013
[44]	杨雄胜. 内部控制范畴定义探索[J]. 会计研究, 2011(8): 46-52. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2011.08.007
[45]	陈信元, 陈冬华, 万华林, 等. 地区差异、薪酬管制与高管腐败[J]. 管理世界, 2009(11): 130-143. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GLSJ200911015.htm
[46]	JENSEN M, MECKLING W. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3(4): 305-360. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
[47]	CAI H, FANG H, XU L C. Eat, drink, firms, government: an investigation of corruption from the entertainment and travel costs of Chinese firms[J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, 54(1): 55-78. doi: 10.1086/651201
[48]	赵凯. 我国城乡消费需求理论与实证研究——以消费量及消费结构为视角[J]. 现代经济探讨, 2009(7): 39-43. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJTL200907011.htm
[49]	戚海峰. 控制欲望对中国消费者独特消费品偏好影响的实证研究[J]. 经济问题探索, 2010(9): 78-86. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJWS201009015.htm
[50]	张慧, 朱立冬, 江江. B2C网站用户购物体验对再购欲望影响实证分析——基于消费者异质性的视角[J]. 商业经济研究, 2016(7): 29-31. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SYJJ201607012.htm
[51]	王曾, 符国群, 黄丹阳, 等. 国有企业CEO"政治晋升"与"在职消费"关系研究[J]. 管理世界, 2014(5): 157-171. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GLSJ201405015.htm
[52]	LUO W, ZHANG Y, ZHU N. Bank ownership and executive perquisites: new evidence from an emerging market[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011, 17(2): 352-370. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119910000805
[53]	权小锋, 吴世农, 文芳. 管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J]. 经济研究, 2010(11): 73-87. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ201011009.htm
[54]	刘小玄. 中国企业发展报告: 1990-2000[M]. 北京: 社会科学文献出版社, 2001.
[55]	步丹璐, 张晨宇, 林腾. 晋升预期降低了国有企业薪酬差距吗?[J]. 会计研究, 2017(1): 82-88. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-KJYJ201701012.htm
[56]	李增泉. 激励机制与企业绩效——一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J]. 会计研究, 2000(1): 24-30. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-KJYJ200001004.htm