人工智能致第三方损害的责任承担：法经济学的视角

吴维锭; 张潇剑

人工智能致第三方损害的责任承担：法经济学的视角

北京大学法学院，北京 100871

基金项目:

教育部人文社会科学项目 10YJA820134

详细信息

作者简介:
吴维锭(1995-)，男，湖南岳阳人，北京大学法学院研究生

张潇剑(1960-)，男，黑龙江哈尔滨人，北京大学法学院教授，博士生导师

中图分类号: DF0-059;TP18
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- 文章访问数: 233
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- PDF下载量: 25
- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2019-02-18
- 网络出版日期: 2021-05-27
- 刊出日期: 2019-05-28

On Liability for the Third Party Damage Caused by Artificial Intelligence: A Perspective of Law and Economics

Law School, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China

摘要

摘要: 法学界对于人工智能的法律地位形成了主体论和客体论两派观点，前者主张赋予人工智能以一定的主体地位，后者则将人工智能定性为财产或工具。对于人工智能造成的第三方损害，主体论认为应当由人工智能承担独立责任，其责任财产来源于制造者或者使用者预先缴纳的资金池，资金池之外的制造者或使用者无须承担更多的责任，而客体论认为制造商或者使用者应当对人工智能造成的损害承担无限责任，但二者之争停留在主观应然层面，缺乏客观实然的分析。法经济学视角下法律规则在效率上存在优劣之分，区分的标准有“更安全地从事活动”和“从事更安全的活动”两种范式。主体论和客体论构造的法律规则在人工智能的不同应用领域有着不同的效率：在自动驾驶车领域，客体论更有效率；在智能投资顾问领域，主体论更有效率。
- 人工智能 /
- 第三方损害 /
- 责任承担 /
- 法律责任 /
- 自动驾驶 /
- 智能投资 /
- 法经济学
Abstract: As for the legal status of AI, there are two opposing views in the lawcommunity : subjectivism and objectivism. Subjectivism advocates giving AI a certain subjectivity, while objectivism defines AI as property or tool. For the third-party damage caused by AI, the subjectivism holds that AI should bear independent responsibility, while the liable property comes from the pool of funds paid in advance by the manufacturer or user. The manufacturer or user except for the pool of funds need not bear more responsibility. By contrast, the objectivism holds that the manufacturer or user should bear unlimited liability for the damage caused by AI. The existing controversy between subjectivism and objectivism remains at the subject level, lacking objective analysis. From the perspective of law and economics, there are advantages and disadvantages in the efficiency of legal rules. There are two paradigms for distinguishing legal rules: "be engaged in activities safer" and "be engaged in safer activities". The legal rules constructed by subjectivism and objectivism have different efficiency in different application fields of artificial intelligence. Objectivism is more efficient in the field of automobile, while subjectivism is more efficient in the field of intelligent investment consultant.
- artificial intelligence /
- the third party damage /
- responsibility /
- legal liability /
- autopilot /
- intelligent investment /
- law and economics

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