Managerial Heterogeneity, Large Shareholder Tunneling and Earnings Management

MA Chao

Volume 36 Issue 3

Jun. 2021

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2021 > 36(3): 93-112

MA Chao. Managerial Heterogeneity, Large Shareholder Tunneling and Earnings Management[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2021, 36(3): 93-112.

Citation:

MA Chao. Managerial Heterogeneity, Large Shareholder Tunneling and Earnings Management[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2021, 36(3): 93-112.

MA Chao. Managerial Heterogeneity, Large Shareholder Tunneling and Earnings Management[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2021, 36(3): 93-112.

Citation:

MA Chao. Managerial Heterogeneity, Large Shareholder Tunneling and Earnings Management[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2021, 36(3): 93-112.

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Managerial Heterogeneity, Large Shareholder Tunneling and Earnings Management

MA Chao

School of Finance, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou 510320, China

Received Date: 2020-10-07
Available Online: 2021-06-22
Publish Date: 2021-05-28

Abstract

Abstract

From the perspective of managerial heterogeneity, managers are classified into three types such as the integrated, the dependent and the independent. On the basis of the classification, empirical analyses are adopted to test the effect and mechanism of managerial heterogeneity on restricting the accrued earnings management behavior and real earnings management behavior. The results show that the degree of accrued and real earnings management is negatively associated with managerial independency; the integrated manager can not play the role of restricting earnings management, while the dependent manager can restrict earnings management to some extent, and the independent manager can most effectively reduce the degree of the two types of earnings management. It is found that the tunneling behavior of large shareholder plays the moderating effects in the process of manager affecting earnings management behavior; namely, the independent manager can most effectively reduce the degree of earnings management through restricting tunneling behavior, and such kind of moderating effect can be magnified with regard to private corporations and relative holding of large shareholder. Therefore, the manager with higher independency can act as an effective corporate governance mechanism on improving the accounting quality through restricting tunneling behavior.
- manager,
- large shareholder tunneling,
- earnings management,
- governance effect,
- accounting information quality,
- corporate governance,
- heterogeneity

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References(48)

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