The Impact of Financial Regulatory Information Sharing on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Empirical Evidence from Joint Credit System

WANG Caiping; DING Haoke; HUANG Zhihong

Volume 40 Issue 6

Nov. 2025

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WANG Caiping, DING Haoke, HUANG Zhihong. The Impact of Financial Regulatory Information Sharing on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Empirical Evidence from Joint Credit System[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2025, 40(6): 31-42.

Citation:

WANG Caiping, DING Haoke, HUANG Zhihong. The Impact of Financial Regulatory Information Sharing on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Empirical Evidence from Joint Credit System[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2025, 40(6): 31-42.

Citation:

WANG Caiping, DING Haoke, HUANG Zhihong. The Impact of Financial Regulatory Information Sharing on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Empirical Evidence from Joint Credit System[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2025, 40(6): 31-42.

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The Impact of Financial Regulatory Information Sharing on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Empirical Evidence from Joint Credit System

1.
Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275
2.
South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510641, China

Received Date: 2025-08-26
Available Online: 2025-12-17
Publish Date: 2025-11-28

Abstract

Abstract

Comprehensively strengthening financial regulation is a crucial measure for implementing high-quality development of the financial sector in serving the real economy. Promoting the sharing of financial regulatory information is of great significance for enhancing the effectiveness of financial supervision. Based on the joint credit pilot policy implemented in 2018 by the former China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission as a quasi-natural experiment, this study examines the impact of financial regulatory information sharing on corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A). The findings show that joint credit significantly increases the probability and frequency of M&A for firms included in the pilot program. Mechanism tests indicate that joint credit promotes corporate M&A decisions primarily through two channels: curbing corporate financialization and strengthening creditor governance. Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the promoting effect of joint credit on corporate M&A decisions is more pronounced when pilot firms have more investment opportunities, belong to high-tech industries, have highly active internal capital markets, or are audited by non-Big Four accounting firms. Tests on economic consequences demonstrate that the implementation of joint credit significantly improves the performance of corporate M&A, indicating that the real economic effects induced by joint credit contribute to resource allocation optimization. This study not only provides empirical evidence for improving the modern financial regulatory system but also offers important policy implications for fully leveraging the power of robust financial regulation to promote high-quality development of the real economy.
- financial regulatory information sharing,
- joint credit system,
- mergers and acquisitions,
- corporate financialization,
- creditor governance

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References(43)

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