Citation: | WANG Dong-yang, LI Cheng. The Effect of Communication and Action on Monetary Policy Expectation Management: Empirical Evidence from Commercial Banks[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(1): 45-61. |
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