Volume 41 Issue 4
Jul.  2026
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LU Shutan, WU Haijun. Alignment Failure, Platform-Based Governance and the Resilience of the Computing-Power Industrial Chain[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2026, 41(4): 4-14.
Citation: LU Shutan, WU Haijun. Alignment Failure, Platform-Based Governance and the Resilience of the Computing-Power Industrial Chain[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2026, 41(4): 4-14.

Alignment Failure, Platform-Based Governance and the Resilience of the Computing-Power Industrial Chain

  • Received Date: 2026-05-07
    Available Online: 2026-09-08
  • Publish Date: 2026-07-28
  • The computing-power industrial chain is characterized by a long technological stack, strong complementarity among its segments, and rapid technological iteration. Under conditions of rapidly evolving technological architectures, continuously reconfigured module boundaries, and unsettled standards, the interface rules, verification rules, and trajectory rules among complementary actors tend to exhibit unstable matching, giving rise to alignment failure. Alignment failure manifests in three forms of interface, verification, and trajectory alignment failure that respectively weaken the substitutability, recoverability, and evolvability of the computing-power industrial chain by raising adaptation and migration costs, increasing the difficulty of quality identification and responsibility attribution, and heightening the risks of asset-specific investment. To address these problems, platform-based actors, as a hybrid governance structure situated between market transactions and hierarchical organization, can mitigate alignment failure through three stages: connection, verification, and evolution. Specifically, they reduce connection costs through interface standardization and multi-source adaptation, enhance the capabilities for quality identification and responsibility attribution through testing, certification, and process tracing, and stabilize long-term technological expectations through standards guidance and version governance. However, platform-based governance may also generate risks such as interface closure, biased information use, self-preferencing, trajectory lock-in, and insufficient investment in long-term maintenance. Therefore, strengthening the resilience of the computing-power industrial chain requires improving institutional arrangements for cross-platform interface migration, computing-power service certification, governance data boundaries, and the maintenance of foundational alignment conditions.
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