Will Gambling Agreement Affect the Reduction of Executives' Holdings:An Empirical Study on the M &amp; A of A Share Listed Companies

GUAN Jing-yi; LIU E-ping

Volume 35 Issue 2

May 2021

Turn off MathJax

Article Contents

Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2020 > 35(2): 68-81

GUAN Jing-yi, LIU E-ping. Will Gambling Agreement Affect the Reduction of Executives' Holdings:An Empirical Study on the M & A of A Share Listed Companies[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(2): 68-81.

Citation:

GUAN Jing-yi, LIU E-ping. Will Gambling Agreement Affect the Reduction of Executives' Holdings:An Empirical Study on the M & A of A Share Listed Companies[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(2): 68-81.

Citation:

PDF( 988 KB)

Will Gambling Agreement Affect the Reduction of Executives' Holdings:An Empirical Study on the M & A of A Share Listed Companies

GUAN Jing-yi¹,
LIU E-ping²

1.
School of Accounting, Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, Guangzhou 510320
2.
Business School, Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China

Received Date: 2019-10-21
Available Online: 2021-05-15
Publish Date: 2020-04-28

Abstract

Abstract

Taking samples of A-share listed companies which implemented M & A with private placement including value adjustment mechanism(VAM) from 2012 to 2016, this paper analyzes the relationship between VAM and managers' stock trading in M & A with private placement, as well as the impact of managers' stock trading on post-issue market performance and financial performance. The results suggest that the higher the annual net profit committed by the target company, the less likely the managers are to reduce their holdings stocks. However, when the information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target company is measured by the private placement discount, the reputation of the asset appraisal institution and the age of the target company, it is found that only when the information asymmetry is low, the committed profit can weaken the managers' stock selling. The direction of managers' stock trading will not significantly affect the post-issue performance, but when the managers sell a large number of stocks, the market performance and financial performance will show a significant decline. These results verify the limited incentive effect of the VAM, and reveal that the factor for the post-issue performance is the degree rather than the direction of the managers' stock trading, which provides reference for investors to interpret VAM and managers' stock trading, and help regulators to further improve the supervision system of insider trading.
- M & A with private placement,
- VAM,
- managers' stock trading,
- market performance,
- financial performance,
- performance commitment

FullText(HTML)

References(35)

References

[1]	潘爱玲, 邱金龙, 杨洋.业绩补偿承诺对标的企业的激励效应研究---来自中小板和创业板上市公司的实证检验[J].会计研究, 2017(3): 46-52. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2017.03.008
[2]	许竹.对赌协议在企业融资中的作用及对策研究[J].金融经济, 2016(20): 160-161. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JRJJ201620069.htm
[3]	曾庆生.高管及其亲属买卖公司股票时"浑水摸鱼"了?---基于信息透明度对内部人交易信息含量的影响研究[J].财经研究, 2014(12): 15-26. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-CJYJ201412002.htm
[4]	RAGOZZINO R, REUER J J. Contingent earnouts in acquisitions of privately held targets[J]. Journal of management, 2008, 35(4): 857-879. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2422306
[5]	DATAR S, FRANKEL R, WOLFSON M. Earnouts: the effects of adverse selection and agency costs on acquisition techniques[J]. Journal of law, economics, & organization, 2001, 17(1): 201-238. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=trueu0026db=buhu0026AN=4809491u0026site=ehost-live
[6]	CHOI A H. Facilitating mergers and acquisitions with earnouts and purchase price adjustments[R]. SSRN Working Paper, 2016.
[7]	李玉辰, 费一文.对赌协议的信号与反信号均衡[J].统计与决策, 2013(14): 50-55. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-TJJC201314015.htm
[8]	项海容, 李建军, 刘星.基于激励视角的对赌合约研究[J].上海经济研究, 2009(3): 92-98. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-1309.2009.03.013
[9]	吕长江, 韩慧博.业绩补偿承诺、协同效应与并购收益分配[J].审计与经济研究, 2014(6): 3-13. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-4833.2014.06.001
[10]	潘妙丽, 张玮婷.上市公司并购重组资产评估相关问题研究[J].证券市场导报, 2017(9): 12-18. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZQDB201709004.htm
[11]	于成永, 于金金.上市公司业绩承诺、公司治理质量与并购溢价[J].中国资产评估, 2017(1): 39-44. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1007-0265.2017.01.007
[12]	赵立新, 姚又文.对重组盈利预测补偿制度的运行分析及完善建议[J].证券市场导报, 2014(4): 4-8. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZQDB201404003.htm
[13]	高闯, 孙宏英, 胡可果.并购重组中大股东补偿承诺与中小股东权益保护---基于苏宁环球与世荣兆业的比较案例研究[J].经济管理, 2010(11): 55-63. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJGU201011014.htm
[14]	窦炜, Hua Sun, 郝颖. "高溢价"还是"高质量"?---我国上市公司并购重组业绩承诺可靠性研究[J].经济管理, 2019(2): 156-171. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJGU201902011.htm
[15]	刘建勇, 董晴.资产重组中大股东承诺、现金补偿与中小股东利益保护---基于海润光伏的案例研究[J].财贸研究, 2014(1): 136-142. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-CMYJ201401020.htm
[16]	饶茜, 侯席培.并购重组业绩承诺与上市公司经营业绩---基于业绩承诺到期视角的分析[J].商业研究, 2017(4): 89-96. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-BUSI201704012.htm
[17]	PIOTROSKI J D, ROULSTONE D T. Do insider trades reflect both contrarian beliefs and superior knowledge about future cash flow realizations?[J]. Journal of accounting and economics, 2005, 39(1): 55-81. doi: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2004.01.003
[18]	KE B, HUDDART S, PETRONI K. What insiders know about future earnings and how they use it: evidence from insider trades[J]. Journal of accounting and economics, 2003, 35(3): 315-346. doi: 10.1016/S0165-4101(03)00036-3
[19]	DOYLE J T, MAGILKE M J. The timing of earnings announcements: an examination of the strategic disclosure hypothesis[J]. Accounting review, 2009, 84(1): 157-182. doi: 10.2308/accr.2009.84.1.157
[20]	JENG L A, METRICK A, ZECKHAUSER R. Estimating the returns to insider trading: a performance-evaluation perspective[J]. The review of economics and statistics, 2003, 85(2): 453-471. doi: 10.1162/003465303765299936
[21]	丁庭栋.会计性信息不对称、新股折价与高管持股变动[J].财经科学, 2013(8): 117-124. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1000-8306.2013.08.014
[22]	许婴鹏, 郭雪萌.分析师关注能遏制高管交易获利吗?[J].财经论丛, 2016(11): 75-83. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-4892.2016.11.009
[23]	王雷, 顾晓敏, 高攀.公司治理环境对高管减持获利性的制约作用研究---基于中国创业板的实证研究[J].经济经纬, 2014(6): 101-107. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1006-1096.2014.06.018
[24]	陈维, 陈伟, 吴世农.证券分析师的股票评级与内部人交易---我国证券分析师是否存在道德风险?[J].证券市场导报, 2014(3): 60-66. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZQDB201403011.htm
[25]	李欢, 罗婷.管理层业绩预测的机会主义行为---来自高管股票交易的证据[J].南开管理评论, 2016(4): 63-74. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1008-3448.2016.04.007
[26]	易志高, 潘子成, 茅宁, 等.策略性媒体披露与财富转移---来自公司高管减持期间的证据[J].经济研究, 2017(4): 166-180. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ201704013.htm
[27]	顾煜, 程丹.创业板高管减持与公司业绩实证研究[J].商业研究, 2013(11): 80-85. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1001-148X.2013.11.014
[28]	李维安, 李慧聪, 郝臣.高管减持与公司治理创业板公司成长的影响机制研究[J].管理科学, 2013(4): 1-12. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JCJJ201304001.htm
[29]	李维安, 陈钢.高管持股、会计稳健性与并购绩效---来自沪深A股上市公司的经验证据[J].审计与经济研究, 2015(4): 3-12. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SJYJ201504001.htm
[30]	许婴鹏, 郭雪萌.高管交易行为对企业并购绩效的预测作用研究[J].证券市场导报, 2016(10): 4-10. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZQDB201610003.htm
[31]	陈维, 吴世农.我国创业板上市公司高管和大股东减持股份的动因及后果---从风险偏好转向风险规避的"偏好逆转"行为研究[J].经济管理, 2013(6): 43-53. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJGU201306008.htm
[32]	FINNERTY J D. The impact of stock transfer restrictions on the private placement discount[J]. Financial management, 2013, 42(3): 575-609. doi: 10.1111/fima.12003
[33]	邓路, 王化成.投资者异质信念与定向增发股价长期市场表现[J].会计研究, 2014(11): 38-45. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2014.11.005
[34]	张雯, 张胜, 李百兴.政治关联、企业并购特征与并购绩效[J].南开管理评论, 2013(2): 64-74. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1008-3448.2013.02.008
[35]	RHODES KROPF M, ROBINSON D T, VISWANATHAN S. Valuation waves and merger activity: the empirical evidence[J]. Journal of financial economics, 2005, 77(3): 561-603. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.06.015