资产剥离对企业财务绩效的影响及其作用机制

郭伟; 郭泽光

资产剥离对企业财务绩效的影响及其作用机制

郭伟,
郭泽光

山西财经大学会计学院，山西太原 030006

基金项目:

山西省软科学一般项目 2017041013-6

详细信息

作者简介:
郭伟(1982-), 女, 山西太原人, 山西财经大学会计学院讲师, 博士研究生

郭泽光(1957-), 男, 山西高平人, 山西财经大学会计学院教授, 博士生导师

中图分类号: F275.5
计量
- 文章访问数: 321
- HTML全文浏览量: 345
- PDF下载量: 32
- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2019-11-12
- 网络出版日期: 2021-05-15
- 刊出日期: 2020-04-28

The Impact and Its Performing Mechanism of Divestiture on Financial Performance

School of Accounting, Shanxi University of Finance and Economics, Taiyuan 030006, China

摘要

摘要: 以2008—2017年我国A股上市公司为研究样本, 实证检验了资产剥离对企业财务绩效的影响及其作用机制。研究发现, 资产剥离的实施能够显著影响企业的财务绩效, 其对企业财务绩效的作用方向取决于剥离前企业的业绩基础, 即对于经营不佳的企业而言, 资产剥离损害了企业财务绩效, 反之则显著提升了企业财务绩效。机制检验表明, 融资约束在资产剥离与企业财务绩效的负向关系中发挥了中介效应, 投资效率在资产剥离与企业财务绩效的正向关系中发挥了中介效应。
- 资产剥离 /
- 财务绩效 /
- 融资约束 /
- 投资效率 /
- 中介效应
Abstract: Using a unique sample constituted by the 2008-2017 A-share listed companies in China, this paper empirically tests the impact of divestitures on corporate financial performance. It is found that the implementation of asset divestiture can significantly improve the financial performance of enterprises, the influence of divestitures depends on the prior performance of the companies. Divestitures can significantly improves the financial performance of higher-performing companies, and vice versa. The findings from mechanism research indicate that financing constraints and investment efficiency play an intermediary role in the negative and positive relationship respectively between divestiture and corporate financial performance.
- divestiture /
- financial performance /
- financing constraints /
- investment efficiency /
- mediation effect

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表 1 变量定义

变量名称	变量符号	变量解释
财务绩效	ROA	总资产收益率
资产剥离	Value	各年企业资产剥离交易总额取自然对数
偿债能力	Lev	以资产负债率表示
发展能力	Growth	以营业收入增长率表示
现金流能力	Fcf	以经营性现金流量除以资产总额表示
企业规模	Size	以企业年末资产总额的自然对数表示
成立时间	Age	以上市公司成立时间表示
产权性质	State	国有控股取1，反之取0
董事会规模	Board	董事会人数
两职合一	Dual	董事长与总经理由一人担任为1，反之取0
股权集中度	First	第一大股东持股比例
年度	Year	年度虚拟变量，控制
行业	Industry	行业虚拟变量，控制

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表 2 主要变量描述性统计结果：全样本

变量	观测值	均值	标准差	25%	中位数	75%	最小值	最大值
ROA	4 040	0.029	0.061	0.008	0.025	0.054	-0.235	0.237
Value	4 040	18.394	1.493	17.281	18.326	19.392	15.578	22.267
Lev	4 040	0.502	0.212	0.341	0.505	0.662	0.070	1.036
Growth	4 040	0.227	0.771	-0.066	0.090	0.276	-0.649	5.813
Fcf	4 040	0.031	0.0767	-0.007	0.032	0.073	-0.245	0.252
Size	4 040	22.193	1.343	21.287	22.076	22.969	19.129	25.890
Age	4 040	2.440	0.585	2.079	2.639	2.890	0.693	3.219
State	4 040	0.508	0.500	0.000	1.000	1.000	0.000	1.000
Dual	4 040	0.205	0.404	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	1.000
Board	4 040	8.781	1.850	7.000	9.000	9.000	5.000	15.000
First	4 040	33.611	14.972	21.680	31.205	44.390	8.060	72.630

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表 3 主要变量描述性统计结果：分样本

变量	低业绩组					高业绩组
变量	N	mean	sd	min	max	N	mean	sd	min	Max
ROA	1 584	-0.008	0.051	-0.235	0.025	1 584	0.067	0.043 7	0.025	0.237
Value	1 584	18.404	1.502	15.573	22.267	1 584	18.386	1.488	15.573	22.267
Lev	1 584	0.562	0.210	0.070	1.036	1 584	0.442	0.196	0.070	1.036
Growth	1 584	0.157	0.744	-0.649	5.813	1 584	0.297	0.791	-0.649	5.813
Fcf	1 584	0.016	0.071	-0.245	0.252	1 584	0.046	0.079	-0.245	0.252
Size	1 584	22.148	1.400	19.129	25.890	1 584	22.238	1.283	19.129	25.890
Age	1 584	2.501	0.524	0.693	3.219	1 584	2.378	0.635	0.693	3.219
State	1 584	0.549	0.498	0.000	1.000	1 584	0.467	0.499	0.000	1.000
Dual	1 584	0.204	0.403	0.000	1.000	1 584	0.206	0.405	0.000	1.000
Board	1 584	8.837	1.942	5.000	15.000	1 584	8.724	1.752	5.000	15.000
First	1 584	32.358	14.270	8.060	72.630	1 584	34.863	15.545	8.060	72.630

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表 4 资产剥离与企业财务绩效：全样本检验

变量	(1)	(2)
Value	0.001^* (1.93)	0.002^** (2.48)
Lev		-0.104^***(-21.60)
Grow		0.008^***(7.40)
CF		0.158^***(13.34)
Size		0.008^***(8.91)
Age		0.002(1.32)
Soe		-0.008^***(-3.67)
Dual		-0.006^*** (-2.84)
Board		-0.001 (-0.21)
First		0.001^*** (3.70)
Year	控制	控制
Industry	控制	控制
cons	-0.015 (-0.914)	-0.158^***(-8.06)
N	4 040	4 040
R² _a	0.045	0.225
F	3.320	13.954

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表 5 资产剥离与企业财务绩效：分组检验

变量	低业绩组	高业绩组
Value	-0.002^**(-2.05)	0.004^***(5.26)
Lev	-0.077^*** (-13.62)	-0.023^***(-3.95)
Growth	0.006^*** (4.18)	0.002(1.63)
Fcf	0.112^***(7.52)	0.086^***(6.86)
Size	0.013^***(12.30)	-0.007^***(-6.77)
Age	0.002(0.86)	0.008^***(4.30)
State	-0.001(-0.28)	-0.007^***(-2.86)
Dual	-0.006^**(-2.35)	-0.001(-0.30)
Board	-0.001(-0.16)	0.001(0.74)
First	0.001(1.41)	0.001(1.42)
cons	-0.269^***(-11.91)	0.132^***(5.87)
Year	控制	控制
Industry	控制	控制
N	1 584	1 584
R² _a	0.228	0.139
F	7.689	4.671

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表 6 分组稳健性检验

变量	(1)高业绩组	(2)低业绩组
L.Value		-0.410^* (-1.96)
Value	0.429^*** (2.91)
First	0.021 (1.59)	0.043^**(2.04)
控制变量	控制	控制
Year	控制	控制
Industry	控制	控制
N	1 584	1 584
R² _a	0.151	0.148

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表 7 2SLS回归结果

变量	(1)	(2)
变量	第一阶段	第二阶段
L.Value	0.226^*** (0.03)
Value		0.393^** (0.19)
控制变量	控制	控制
Cons	4.303^***(0.67)	19.283^***(1.46)
N	1 205	1 205
R² _a	0.292	0.323

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表 8 加入企业多元化程度(EDI)作为控制变量后的回归结果

变量	ROA
Value	0.002^** (2.31)
Lev	-0.112^*** (-22.20)
Grow	0.009^*** (6.55)
Fcf	0.172^*** (13.85)
Size	0.010^*** (11.00)
Age	0.000 9 (0.49)
State	-0.006 3^*** (-2.97)
Dual	-0.004 5^** (-2.00)
Board	-0.000 2 (-0.42)
First	0.000 2^*** (3.68)
EDI	0.001 (0.27)
Cons	-0.190^*** (-9.31)
Year	控制
Industry	控制
N	4040
R²_a	0.995

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表 9 资产剥离与企业财务绩效的机制检验：低业绩组

变量	模型(2)	模型(3)	模型(4)
变量	ROA	SA	ROA
Value	-0.002^** (-2.05)	0.007^*** (3.40)	-0.001 (-1.629)
SA			-0.046^*** (-4.80)
Lev	-0.077^*** (-13, 63)	0.017 (1.12)	-0.075^*** (-13.28)
Grow	0.006^*** (4.18)	0.002 (0.48)	0.006^*** (4.29)
Fcf	0.112^*** (7.52)	-0.131^*** (-3.63)	0.106^*** (7.14)
Size	0.013^*** (12.30)	1.192^*** (459.06)	0.068^*** (5.92)
Age	0.002 (0.86)	-0.038^*** (-7.17)	0.001 (0.11)
State	-0.001 (-0.28)	-0.008 (-1.40)	-0.001 (-0.43)
Dual	0.006^** (-2.35)	0.012^* (1.82)	-0.006^** (-2.07)
Board	-0.001 (0.16)	0.004^*** (2.58)	0.001 (0.13)
First	0.001 (1.41)	0.001 (0.49)	0.001 (1.47)
Roe		0.001 (0.03)
Cons	-0.269^*** (-11.91)	-21.642^*** (-3.90)	-1.262^*** (-0.07)
Year	控制	控制	控制
Industry	控制	控制	控制

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表 10 资产剥离与财务绩效作用机制检验：高业绩组

变量	模型(5)	模型(6)	模型(7)
变量	ROA	Inv	ROA
Value	0.004^***(5.26)	0.010^***(8.02)	0.003^***(4.15)
Inv			0.065^*** (3.71)
Lev	-0.023^***(-3.95)	-0.030^***(-3.29)	-0.032^***(-5.31)
Grow	0.002(1.63)	0.026^***(15.12)	0.001(0.74)
Fcf	0.086^***(6.86)	-0.047^**(-2.56)	0.087^***(6.78)
Size	-0.007^***(-6.77)	-0.007^***(-4.79)	-0.004^***(-3.98)
Age	0.008^***(4.230)	-0.007^**(-2.46)	0.007^***(3.40)
State	-0.007^***(-2.86)	0.009^***(-2.85)	-0.004(-1.60)
Dual	-0.001(-0.30)	-0.005(-0.88)	0.000(0.12)
Board	0.001(0.74)	0.005(0.56)	0.000(-0.04)
First	0.000 1(1.42)	0.000(0.28)	0.000^*(1.75)
Roe		0.001^*** (3.69)
Cons	0.132^***(5.87)	0.077^**(2.35)	0.088^***(3.84)
Year	控制	控制	控制
Industry	控制	控制	控制
N	2 020	2 020	2 020
R²_a	0.139	0.235	0.149
F	4.671	7.205	4.558

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