Buyer Power in Market Power Assessment: Theoretical Logic and Practical Approaches
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摘要: 具有市场力量的买卖双方在博弈或合作中能引发上下游市场力量的异化，因此，在垄断案件分析中必须考虑买方势力，将之纳入市场力量的评估因素。在反垄断语境下，买方势力特指结构性的买方垄断势力，不含场景性的买方议价能力。在不同策略情境中，买方势力既能强化或抵消上游卖方的市场力量，也能直接强化或间接抵消买方在下游的市场力量，进而实质性且持续地影响市场竞争。买方势力对市场力量的影响是其策略行为与势力水平综合作用的结果。将买方势力纳入市场力量的评估框架需要消解规范与实施层面的制度障碍。在规范依据上，需要在反垄断法中增补买方势力因素；在法律实施上，需要执法机构就买方势力问题开展常态化市场研究。Abstract: The counteraction or cooperation between buyers and sellers who have market power will lead to unpredicted interaction of upstream and downstream market power. It requires that buyer power should be considered in antitrust cases and integrated into the market power assessment. In such cases, buyer power specifically refers to the structural monopsony power from the buyer, excluding situational bargaining power. In conjunction with different strategic behaviors, buyer power may strengthen or counteract the upstream seller's market power, and may also directly strengthen or indirectly counterbalance the downstream buyer's market power. Incorporating buyer power into the market power assessment framework requires addressing institutional barriers in both regulations and enforcement. In order to properly take into account buyer power in market power assessment, it is necessary to add buyer power to antitrust regulations and conduct market study on buyer power issues in addition to building a feasible analytical framework.
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Key words:
- buyer power /
- bargaining power /
- market power /
- anti-monopoly law /
- case-by-case analysis
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表 1 买方势力对市场力量的可能影响
作用方 四种效果 八种原因 买方势力 抵消卖方市场力量 垄断买方优待小型卖方 垄断买方对垄断卖方压价 强化卖方市场力量 垄断买方优待垄断卖方 垄断买方对小型卖方压价 直接强化买方市场力量 垄断卖方优待垄断买方 垄断卖方对小型买方提价 间接抵消买方市场力量 垄断卖方优待小型买方 垄断卖方向垄断买方提价 
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