Does Internet Third-party Payment Platform Become Monopoly: Based on the Measurement of Market Power

PAN Jia-dong; CHU Hao-dong

Volume 36 Issue 4

Aug. 2021

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2021 > 36(4): 29-37

PAN Jia-dong, CHU Hao-dong. Does Internet Third-party Payment Platform Become Monopoly: Based on the Measurement of Market Power[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2021, 36(4): 29-37.

Citation:

PAN Jia-dong, CHU Hao-dong. Does Internet Third-party Payment Platform Become Monopoly: Based on the Measurement of Market Power[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2021, 36(4): 29-37.

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Does Internet Third-party Payment Platform Become Monopoly: Based on the Measurement of Market Power

Department of Economics, Party School of Zhejiang Provincial Committee of the Communist Party of China，Hangzhou 311121，China

Received Date: 2020-04-01
Available Online: 2021-08-04
Publish Date: 2021-07-18

Abstract

Abstract

The market power of a company is an important indicator to identify monopoly. Anti-monopoly in platform economyis needed to fully consider the market power of platforms. This study selects third-party payment as the research object, and uses the revised Lerner Index to measure the market power of third-party payment market platforms. The results show that 9 platforms including Alipay and Tenpay all use the market power to enhance monopoly capability and obtain the monopoly position, which the dominant market power is mainly used to enhance the monopoly ability.However, there is a divergence between market share and market power. The two platforms with the highest market share are Alipay and Tenpay. The market power of these two platforms is at the bottom. Accordingly, market share and market power of platforms should be used as an important criterion for anti-monopoly of the internet platform economy such as third-party payment.
- third-party payment,
- platform economy,
- platform manufacturer,
- market power,
- market share,
- Lerner Index,
- monopoly position,
- anti-monopoly,
- internet platform

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References(26)

References

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