Can the Judicial System Reform Curb Corporate Violations: A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Reform of Provincial Control of Human Resources and Property in Local Courts

SUN Yan-yang; ZHENG Yi

Volume 38 Issue 6

Nov. 2023

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2023 > 38(6): 98-112

SUN Yan-yang, ZHENG Yi. Can the Judicial System Reform Curb Corporate Violations: A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Reform of Provincial Control of Human Resources and Property in Local Courts[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(6): 98-112.

Citation:

SUN Yan-yang, ZHENG Yi. Can the Judicial System Reform Curb Corporate Violations: A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Reform of Provincial Control of Human Resources and Property in Local Courts[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(6): 98-112.

Citation:

SUN Yan-yang, ZHENG Yi. Can the Judicial System Reform Curb Corporate Violations: A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Reform of Provincial Control of Human Resources and Property in Local Courts[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(6): 98-112.

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Can the Judicial System Reform Curb Corporate Violations: A Quasi-natural Experiment Based on the Reform of Provincial Control of Human Resources and Property in Local Courts

SUN Yan-yang¹,
ZHENG Yi^2
,

1.
School of Accounting, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou 510320, China
2.
Civil, Commercial and Economic Law School, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing 100088, China

Received Date: 2023-07-13
Available Online: 2023-12-21
Publish Date: 2023-11-28

Abstract

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of the reform of the judicial system on corporate violations in China's A-share listed companies between 2007 and 2020. The study employs the staggered difference-in-difference method to explore the effects of the reform of universal management of human resources and property in local courts below the province. The findings demonstrate that the reform of the judicial system can significantly mitigate the frequency and tendency of corporate violations. This conclusion is robust even after conducting several tests. However, the effect of the reform varies depending on factors such as the size of the company, the nature of property rights, and the jurisdiction of different jurisdictions. Notably, small-scale enterprises, private enterprises, and enterprises in non-jurisdictional jurisdictions benefit more from the reform of the local judicial system. The study further reveals that the reform of the judicial system has a positive influence mechanism on curbing corporate violations by easing corporate financing constraints and enhancing corporate governance.
- judicial system reform,
- provincial control of human resources and property,
- corporate fraud,
- financing constraint,
- corporate governance

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References(48)

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