Can Strategic Deviance Reduce Corporate Risk of Advanced Manufacturing?Research under the Background of Sino-US Trade Friction

LI Jian; LIU Shi-jie; LI Yan-shu; BAO Yao-dong

Volume 35 Issue 3

May 2021

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2020 > 35(3): 30-43

LI Jian, LIU Shi-jie, LI Yan-shu, BAO Yao-dong. Can Strategic Deviance Reduce Corporate Risk of Advanced Manufacturing?Research under the Background of Sino-US Trade Friction[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(3): 30-43.

Citation:

LI Jian, LIU Shi-jie, LI Yan-shu, BAO Yao-dong. Can Strategic Deviance Reduce Corporate Risk of Advanced Manufacturing?Research under the Background of Sino-US Trade Friction[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(3): 30-43.

Citation:

LI Jian, LIU Shi-jie, LI Yan-shu, BAO Yao-dong. Can Strategic Deviance Reduce Corporate Risk of Advanced Manufacturing?Research under the Background of Sino-US Trade Friction[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(3): 30-43.

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Can Strategic Deviance Reduce Corporate Risk of Advanced Manufacturing?Research under the Background of Sino-US Trade Friction

1.
School of Business, Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023
2.
School of Business, Nantong Institute of Technology, Nantong 226001, China

Received Date: 2020-01-27
Available Online: 2021-05-13
Publish Date: 2020-06-28

Abstract

Abstract

In the context of Sino-US trade friction, it is particularly important to study the risk of Chinese enterprises in advanced manufacturing. Based on the strategic balance theory and the neo-institutional theory, the relationship between strategic deviance and the risk of advanced manufacturing is first explored with the competition pressure mechanism, to explore how strategic deviance can effectively balance uncertainty and homogeneous competition to minimize corporate risk in advanced manufacturing, and on this basis, consider the situational effects of property rights and customer concentration. The empirical results show that there is a positive U-type relationship between strategic deviance and corporate risk; the nature of non-private property rights weakens the positive U-type relationship between strategic deviance and corporate risk; customer concentration strengthens the positive U-type relationship between strategic deviance and corporate risk. In addition, compared with non-private enterprises, the positive adjustment effect of customer concentration is more significant in private enterprises. The findings provide a reference for advanced manufacturing enterprises under the current trade friction to achieve corporate risk optimization through reasonable management and control of strategic deviance.
- advanced manufacturing,
- strategic deviance,
- corporate risk,
- customer concentration,
- property rights,
- trade friction,
- private enterprise

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References(35)

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