The Effects of Founder's Turnover on Corporate Innovation Investment: An Altruism Perspective

XIAO Rong; MA Chun-ai; SONG Guang-rui

Volume 36 Issue 6

Nov. 2021

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XIAO Rong, MA Chun-ai, SONG Guang-rui. The Effects of Founder's Turnover on Corporate Innovation Investment: An Altruism Perspective[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2021, 36(6): 68-78.

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XIAO Rong, MA Chun-ai, SONG Guang-rui. The Effects of Founder's Turnover on Corporate Innovation Investment: An Altruism Perspective[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2021, 36(6): 68-78.

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The Effects of Founder's Turnover on Corporate Innovation Investment: An Altruism Perspective

School of Business Administration, China University of Petroleum, Beijing 102249, China

Received Date: 2021-05-12
Available Online: 2021-12-16
Publish Date: 2021-11-28

Abstract

Abstract

The turnover of founder brings a great adjustment of the management in the enterprise, and its impact on innovation investment is also worth further discussion. This paper attempts to analyze the mechanism of founder's turnover and its impact on the innovation investment. It is found that the altruistic behavior plays an intermediary role featured with the altruism-driven; the relationship between founder's turnover and a company's investment in innovation is more pronounced in high-tech companies; however, the government subsidy can negatively regulate the altruistic behavior of the founder when he leaves office, thus reducing the damage to the corporate innovation investment. The conclusions of this paper open the black box between the turnover of the founder and the innovation investment of the enterprise, reveal the role of altruistic behavior, and trigger the need for the government to reasonably choose the timing of government subsidies, in order to guarantee the innovation sustainability of private enterprises.

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References

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