Campaign-style Law Enforcement from the Perspective of Residual Control Rights: Investigation From Legal Economics

YANG Li

Volume 34 Issue 6

May 2021

Turn off MathJax

Article Contents

Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2019 > 34(6): 100-112

YANG Li. Campaign-style Law Enforcement from the Perspective of Residual Control Rights: Investigation From Legal Economics[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(6): 100-112.

Citation:

YANG Li. Campaign-style Law Enforcement from the Perspective of Residual Control Rights: Investigation From Legal Economics[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(6): 100-112.

Citation:

PDF( 1306 KB)

Campaign-style Law Enforcement from the Perspective of Residual Control Rights: Investigation From Legal Economics

YANG Li

School of Law, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China

Received Date: 2019-07-10
Available Online: 2021-05-27
Publish Date: 2021-05-27

Abstract

Abstract

Campaign-style law enforcement has become a weapon of governance that cannot be ignored in the field of administrative law enforcement. Different disciplines have drawn different research conclusions from different approaches and methods.Generally speaking, the evaluation of campaign-style law enforcement in the academic circles has gone through three different stages: early complete denial, gradual rational understanding and limited affirmation at present. Based on the principal premise of principal-agent, residual control and rational expectation, this paper proposes a model of campaign-style law enforcement by constructing an economic model of administrative law enforcement agencies, local governments and social benefits, making a rational interpretation of campaign-style law enforcement. It is argued that the essence of campaign-style law enforcement is the contingent distribution of residual control rights between local governments and administrative law enforcement agencies due to different situations, which is tested by real cases, and it may achieve the "institutionalization" when the specific conditions in law are met.
- campaign-style law enforcement,
- conventional law enforcement,
- principal-agent theory,
- residual control rights,
- institutionalization,
- legal economics

FullText(HTML)

References(33)

References

[1]	朱晓燕, 王怀章. 对运动式行政执法的反思——从劣质奶粉事件说起[J]. 青海社会科学, 2005(1): 135-138. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-QHSH200501031.htm
[2]	程琥. 运动式执法的司法规制与政府有效治理[J]. 行政法学研究, 2015(1): 75-81, 128. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XZFX201501009.htm
[3]	冯仕政. 中国国家运动的形成与变异: 基于政体的整体性解释[J]. 开放时代, 2011(1): 73-97. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-KFSD201101006.htm
[4]	周雪光. 运动型治理机制: 中国国家治理的制度逻辑再思考[J]. 开放时代, 2012(9): 105-125. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-KFSD201209014.htm
[5]	吴元元. 双重博弈结构中的激励效应与运动式执法——以法律经济学为解释视角[J]. 法商研究, 2015(1): 54-61. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-FSYJ201501010.htm
[6]	胡伟强. 运动式执法的社会效果[J]. 法律和社会科学, 2017(1): 252-274.
[7]	杨志军, 彭勃. 有限否定与类型化承认: 评判运动式治理的价值取向[J]. 社会科学, 2013(3): 15-24. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SHKX201303003.htm
[8]	李辉. "运动式治理"缘何长期存在?——一个本源性分析[J]. 行政论坛, 2017(5): 138-144. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XZNT201705021.htm
[9]	李元珍. 领导联系点的组织运作机制——基于运动式治理与科层制的协同视角[J]. 甘肃行政学院学报, 2016(5): 59-68, 126. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GSXX201605006.htm
[10]	张新文. 典型治理与项目治理: 地方政府运动式治理模式探究[J]. 社会科学, 2015(12): 13-21. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SHKX201512002.htm
[11]	郑春燕. 行政裁量中的政策考量——以"运动式"执法为例[J]. 法商研究, 2008(2): 62-67. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-FSYJ200802011.htm
[12]	赖诗攀. 中国科层组织如何完成任务: 一个研究述评[J]. 甘肃行政学院学报, 2015(2): 15-30, 125. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GSXX201502002.htm
[13]	任星欣, 余嘉俊, 施祖麟. 制度建设中的运动式治理——对运动式治理的再思考[J]. 公共管理评论, 2015(2): 75-85.
[14]	吴克昌, 关飞洲. 街头官僚运动式执法的动员机制——基于广州市A街道流动摊贩治理问题的探讨[J]. 湘潭大学学报: 哲学社会科学版, 2018(2): 25-32. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XTDX201802006.htm
[15]	孟德斯鸠. 论法的精神(上册)[M]. 张雁深, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 1961: 7.
[16]	喻中. 法学方法论[M]. 北京: 法律出版社, 2014: 83.
[17]	阿道夫·A·伯利, 加德纳·C·米恩斯. 现代公司与私有财产[M]. 甘华鸣等, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 2005.
[18]	张璋. 基于央地关系分析大国治理的制度逻辑[J]. 中国人民大学学报, 2017(4): 89-98. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZRDX201704010.htm
[19]	HOLMSTROM, BENGT, PAUL MILGROM. Ultitask principal-agent analyses: incentive contracts, asset ownership, and job design[J]. Journal of law, economics & amp; orgnization, 1991, 7(7): 24. http://www.researchgate.net/publication/297445413_Multi-task_Principal-Agent_Analyses_Incentive_Contracts_Asset_Ownership_and_Job_Design
[20]	AGHION, PHILIPPE, JEAN TIROLE. Formal and real authority in organizations[J]. Journal of political economy, 1997, 105(1): 1-29. http://ideas.repec.org/p/hrv/faseco/4554125.html
[21]	戴治勇. 多任务司法裁判与相机控制权分配[J]. 法制与社会发展, 2016(5): 34-42. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SFAS201605005.htm
[22]	佟健. 官员激励、任期制与为官不为[J]. 广东财经大学学报, 2017(6): 15-20. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SONG201706002.htm
[23]	SANFORD J GROSSMAN, OLIVER D HART. The costs and the benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration[J]. Journal of political economy, 1986, 94(4): 691-719. http://www.mendeley.com/research/costs-benefits-ownership/
[24]	高鸿业. 西方经济学(宏观部分)[M]. 6版. 北京: 中国人民大学出版社, 2015: 662-663.
[25]	AGHION, PHILIPPE, PATRICK BOLTON. An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting[J]. The review of economic studies, 1992, 59(3): 473-494. http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/content/59/3/473.short
[26]	罗许生. 从运动式执法到制度性执法[J]. 重庆社会科学, 2005(7): 89-92. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-CQSK200507019.htm
[27]	赵华军. 关于运动式行政执法的综合思考——从某市整治"黑车"说起[J]. 人大研究, 2007(4): 24-27. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-RDYJ200704011.htm
[28]	李辉, 皇甫鑫, 孙艳伟. 运动式治理研究: 核心议题与学术论争[J]. 天津行政学院学报, 2017(4): 61-66. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-TJXZ201704009.htm
[29]	刘开君. 运动式治理的历史、现状与转型: 一个研究综述[J]. 山西农业大学学报: 社会科学版, 2017(3): 57-64. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SXND201703010.htm
[30]	阳李, 吴应甲. 美国行政法演化路径探析——一个法律史的视角[J]. 北华大学学报: 社会科学版, 2017(6): 82-89. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-BHDX201706014.htm
[31]	龙宗智. 论司法改革中的相对合理主义[J]. 中国社会科学, 1999(2): 130-140. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZSHK902.013.htm
[32]	喻中. 论"治-综治"取向的中国法治模式[J]. 法商研究, 2011(3): 10-18. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-FSYJ201103004.htm
[33]	倪星, 原超. 地方政府的运动式治理是如何走向"常规化"的?——基于S市市监局"清无"专项行动的分析[J]. 公共行政评论, 2014(2): 70-96, 171-172. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GGXZ201402005.htm