Can Private Equity Investment Alleviate the Inefficient Investment of SMEs: Empirical Evidence from Listing on SMEs and GEM

XIE Yang; HONG Zheng

Volume 35 Issue 4

May 2021

Turn off MathJax

Article Contents

Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2020 > 35(4): 58-71

XIE Yang, HONG Zheng. Can Private Equity Investment Alleviate the Inefficient Investment of SMEs: Empirical Evidence from Listing on SMEs and GEM[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(4): 58-71.

Citation:

XIE Yang, HONG Zheng. Can Private Equity Investment Alleviate the Inefficient Investment of SMEs: Empirical Evidence from Listing on SMEs and GEM[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(4): 58-71.

Citation:

PDF( 1448 KB)

Can Private Equity Investment Alleviate the Inefficient Investment of SMEs: Empirical Evidence from Listing on SMEs and GEM

Institute of Chinese Financial Studies, Southwest University of Finance and Economics, Chengdu 611130, China

Received Date: 2020-04-23
Available Online: 2021-05-08
Publish Date: 2020-08-28

Abstract

Abstract

Small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs) are more likely to fall into the inefficient investment and development dilemma of under-investment and over-investment. Based on the theory of inefficient investment and private equity investment(PE), this paper puts forward the theoretical hypothesis of PE's influence on inefficient investment behavior. Through the calculation of the inefficient investment of SMEs, it is found that the inefficient investment behavior of SMEs generally exists; compared with over-investment, the problem of under-investment is particularly serious; PE can restrain the inefficient investment of SMEs by controlling the agency cost and alleviating the information asymmetry contradiction. It is also found that PE with different characteristics has different effects on inefficient investment: PE with high shareholding ratio and joint investment has stronger mitigation effect on inefficient investment, and PE with long-term detention in SMEs has weaker mitigation effect. The results verify the inhibition of PE on the inefficient investment behavior of SMEs and its mechanism.
- private equity investment,
- inefficient investment,
- SMEs,
- corporate governance,
- SME board,
- GEM,
- listed company

FullText(HTML)

References(31)

References

[1]	张英明, 张精. 融资约束条件下中小企业非效率投资问题研究——基于中小企业板上市公司的经验数据[J]. 会计之友, 2017(5): 97-102. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-5937.2017.05.017
[2]	池国华, 杨金, 郭菁晶. 内部控制、EVA考核对非效率投资的综合治理效应研究——来自国有控股上市公司的经验证据[J]. 会计研究, 2016(10): 63-69. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2016.10.009
[3]	MYERS S C, MAJLUF N S. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 1984, 13(2): 187-221.
[4]	RICHARDSON S. Over-investment of free cash flow[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing, 2006, 11(2-3): 159-189. http://www.zhangqiaokeyan.com/open-access_resources_thesis/010009967676.html
[5]	THOMAS J CHEMMANUR, KARTHIK KRISHNAN, DEBARSHI K NANDY. How does venture capital financing improve efficiency in private firms?a look beneath the surface[J]. The Review of Financial Studies, 2011, 24(12): 4037-4090. doi: 10.1093/rfs/hhr096
[6]	冯慧群. 风险投资是民营企业IPO的"救星"吗[J]. 财贸经济, 2016(8): 66-80. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1005-913X.2016.08.028
[7]	FRANCO MODIGLIANI, MERTON H MILLER. The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment[J]. The American E-conomic Review, 1958, 48(3): 261-297. http://www.mendeley.com/research/american-economic-association-cost-capital-corporation-finance-theory-investment/
[8]	JENSEN M C. Agency cost of free casrateh flow, corpo finance[J]. American Economic Review, 1986, 76(2): 323-329.
[9]	蔡宁, 何星. 社会网络能够促进风险投资的"增值"作用吗?——基于风险投资网络与上市公司投资效率的研究[J]. 金融研究, 2015(12): 178-193. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JRYJ201512012.htm
[10]	JULIA HIRSCH, UWE WALZ. Why do contracts differ between venture capital types?[J]. Small Business Economics, 2013, 40(3): 1-15. doi: 10.1007/s11187-011-9388-6
[11]	蔡宁, 邓小路, 程亦沁. 风险投资网络具有"传染"效应吗——基于上市公司超额薪酬的研究[J]. 南开管理评论, 2017(2): 17-31. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1008-3448.2017.02.003
[12]	杨昀, 邹正宜. 风险投资公司对创业企业投资行为的影响[J]. 金融发展研究, 2017(8): 41-48. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-2265.2017.08.006
[13]	罗琦, 李辉. 企业生命周期、股利决策与投资效率[J]. 经济评论, 2015(2): 115-125. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJPL201502010.htm
[14]	金宇超, 靳庆鲁, 宣扬. "不作为"或"急于表现": 企业投资中的政治动机[J]. 经济研究, 2016(10): 126-139. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ201610011.htm
[15]	彭文敏, 史本山. 纵向研发合作中的投资决策与甄别合同设计[J]. 工业技术经济, 2017(9): 10-16. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-910X.2017.09.002
[16]	FABIO BERTONI, MARÍA ALEJANDRA FERRER, JOSéMART. The different roles played by venture capital and private equity investors on the investment activity of their portfolio firms[J]. Springer US, 2013, 40(3): 607-633. http://ideas.repec.org/p/hal/journl/hal-02312955.html
[17]	王雷, 陈梦扬. 风险投资能够有效缓解企业融资约束吗?——基于企业社会资本中介效应的分析[J]. 财经论丛(浙江财经大学学报), 2017(5): 39-47. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-CJLC201705005.htm
[18]	BARRY C B, MUSCARELLA C J, III J W P, et al. The role of venture capital in the creation of public companies: evidence from the going-public process[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(2): 447-472. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(90)90064-7
[19]	GOMPERS P. Grandstanding in the venture capital industry[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, 42(1): 133-156. doi: 10.1016/0304-405X(96)00874-4
[20]	MEGGINSON W L, WEISS K A. Venture capitalist certification in initial public offerings[J]. Journal of Finance, 1991, 46(3): 879-903. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb03770.x
[21]	胡海峰, 倪淑慧. 金融发展过度: 最新研究进展评述及对中国的启示[J]. 经济学动态, 2013(11): 88-96. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJXD201311012.htm
[22]	金永红, 李媛媛, 罗丹. 风险投资公司特征与联合投资动机[J]. 中国科技论坛, 2015(10): 130-135. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGKT201510024.htm
[23]	CAULEY JANE A, HOCHBERG MARC C, LUI LI-YUNG, et al. Long-term risk of incident vertebral fractures. [J]. Pubmed, 2007, 298(23): 2761-2767. http://europepmc.org/abstract/med/18165669
[24]	YI TAN, HONG HUANG, HAITIAN LU. The effect of venture capital investment-evidence from China's small and medium-sized enterprises board[J]. Journal of Small Business Management, 2013, 51(1): 138-157. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-627X.2012.00379.x
[25]	CHURCHILL NEIL C, LEWIS VIRGINIA L. Bank lending to new and growing enterprises[J]. Elsevier, 1986, 1(2): 193-206. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/0883902686900145
[26]	吴超鹏, 吴世农, 程静雅, 等. 风险投资对上市公司投融资行为影响的实证研究[J]. 经济研究, 2012(1): 105-119, 160. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ201201011.htm
[27]	肖作平, 陈德胜. 公司治理结构对代理成本的影响——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J]. 财贸经济, 2006(12): 29-35. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-CMJJ200612005.htm
[28]	朱兴勤. 托宾Q理论在我国的不适用性分析[J]. 洛阳理工学院学报: 社会科学版, 2011(4): 47-49. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-LYDS201104012.htm
[29]	吕长江, 张艳秋. 企业财务状况对负债代理成本的影响[J]. 数量经济技术经济研究, 2002(12): 108-112. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SLJY200212027.htm
[30]	DOUGLAS CUMMING, NA DAI. Hedge fund regulation and misreported returns[J]. Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2010, 16(5): 829-857. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-036X.2010.00576.x
[31]	杨筝, 刘放, 李茫茫. 利率市场化、非效率投资与资本配置——基于中国人民银行取消贷款利率上下限的自然实验[J]. 金融研究, 2017(5): 81-96. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JRYJ201705006.htm