On the Impact of Mixed Equity on Executive Compensation Stickiness: Analysis Based on the Mixed Ownership Reform

CHE Jia-li; CHEN Zan-yu

Volume 36 Issue 4

Aug. 2021

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2021 > 36(4): 66-80

CHE Jia-li, CHEN Zan-yu. On the Impact of Mixed Equity on Executive Compensation Stickiness: Analysis Based on the Mixed Ownership Reform[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2021, 36(4): 66-80.

Citation:

CHE Jia-li, CHEN Zan-yu. On the Impact of Mixed Equity on Executive Compensation Stickiness: Analysis Based on the Mixed Ownership Reform[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2021, 36(4): 66-80.

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On the Impact of Mixed Equity on Executive Compensation Stickiness: Analysis Based on the Mixed Ownership Reform

Guangdong University of Financial and Economics, Guangzhou 510320, China

Received Date: 2020-11-11
Available Online: 2021-08-04
Publish Date: 2021-07-18

Abstract

Abstract

Taking the A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2018 as the research object, based on the two different reform modes of state-owned enterprises restructuring into mixed ownership enterprises and private enterprises introducing state-owned capital, this paper investigates the impact of mixed equity on executive compensation stickiness.The results show that whether state-owned enterprises or private enterprises, improving the degree of mixed equity balance will help to restrain the executive compensation stickiness; in the state-owned enterprises, improving the depth of non-state-owned equity and foreign equity has better inhibition effect on executive compensation stickiness than that of private equity; in the private enterprises, improving the depth of state-owned equity also helps to inhibit executive compensation stickiness.Further research shows that, compared with state-owned enterprises, the depth of non-state-owned equity and foreign equity can inhibit executive compensation stickiness more; the degree of mixed equity balance can inhibit executive compensation stickiness in both types of enterprises. The depth of private equity has no significant effect on executive compensation stickiness in both types of enterprises.The degree of mixed equity balance and state-owned equity can also significantly inhibit executive compensation stickiness in private family enterprises and private non-family enterprises.Therefore, it is proposed to give full play to the role of mixed equity balance, rationally allocate the proportion of state-owned capital and non-state-owned capital, optimize the executive executive stock ownership plan, break the barriers to entry of monopoly industries to realize industrial opening-up.
- mixed ownership reform,
- ownership structure,
- mixed equity,
- heterogeneous shareholders,
- executive compensation,
- compensation stickiness,
- executive ownership,
- private enterprise,
- state-owned equity

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References(50)

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