Economic Analysis of National Standpoint, Public Preference and Diplomatic Discourse

National standpoint is inherent and rational while public preference rational and irrational. The construction of diplomatic discourse requires the equilibrium between national standpoint and public preference. Rational analysis of diplomatic discourse offers a special perspective for the understanding of national diplomatic policies and world public opinion. Based on the maximization of government's utility function, this paper establishes a national policy game model and analyzes optimal national policy. Diplomatic discourse is the best expression of optimal national policy. Then, a diplomatic discourse game model is constructed to describe the impact of national standpoint and public reference on diplomatic discourse. The findings show that the national policy game leads to a stable Nash Equilibrium and it is convergent, and optimal national policy is determined by national standpoint, the gap between their own national standpoint and their preference for cooperation; suppose that the country's national standpoint and optimal policy are fixed, the construction of diplomatic discourse is determined by both the public preference for hawkish or dovish language style and government's willingness to cooperate.