Do Enterprises Choose Environmental Protection Investment or Green Innovation under Environmental Administrative Penalties: The Interpretation under Corporate Life Cycle Theory

DU Wen-cui; CHEN Qiu-yao

Volume 39 Issue 4

Jul. 2024

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2024 > 39(4): 33-49

DU Wen-cui, CHEN Qiu-yao. Do Enterprises Choose Environmental Protection Investment or Green Innovation under Environmental Administrative Penalties: The Interpretation under Corporate Life Cycle Theory[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2024, 39(4): 33-49.

Citation:

DU Wen-cui, CHEN Qiu-yao. Do Enterprises Choose Environmental Protection Investment or Green Innovation under Environmental Administrative Penalties: The Interpretation under Corporate Life Cycle Theory[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2024, 39(4): 33-49.

Citation:

DU Wen-cui, CHEN Qiu-yao. Do Enterprises Choose Environmental Protection Investment or Green Innovation under Environmental Administrative Penalties: The Interpretation under Corporate Life Cycle Theory[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2024, 39(4): 33-49.

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Do Enterprises Choose Environmental Protection Investment or Green Innovation under Environmental Administrative Penalties: The Interpretation under Corporate Life Cycle Theory

School of Economics, Capital University of Economics and Business, Beijing 100070, China

Received Date: 2024-04-20
Available Online: 2024-08-27
Publish Date: 2024-07-28

Abstract

Abstract

Enterprises at different stages of life cycle often adopt different strategic tendencies, organizational structures, and corporate behaviors, and may take different environmental behavior choices after being subject to environmental administrative penalties (EAPs). By collecting EAPs data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies, the study conducted the empirical test from the life cycle perspective to examine the impact of EAPs on corporate environmental investment and green technology innovation based on PSM-DID method. The results show that the EAPs significantly increase corporate environmental investments but have no significant impact on green technology innovation. Among them, enterprises in growth and mature periods significantly increase their investments in environmental protection; enterprises in mature period also intensify efforts towards green technology innovation while enterprises in decline period do not change their environmental behaviors. The multiple penalties have the stronger deterrent effect on enterprises, and even declining enterprises may increase the investment in environmental protection after receiving multiple penalties. The effects of EAPs are more significant on heavily polluting industries, non-state-owned enterprises, and enterprises with higher levels of environmental information disclosure. Based on these, environmental agency should construct an accurate supervision system for the corporate life cycle to improve the accuracy of environmental supervision, promote reform by punishment and optimize enterprise environmental behavior comprehensively.
- environmental regulation,
- environmental administrative penalty,
- corporate life cycle theory,
- environmental protection investment,
- green innovation

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References(36)

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