The Organizational Logic and Governance Effect of Vertical Management Reform of Environmental Protection

CHEN Qi-bo

Volume 39 Issue 2

Mar. 2024

Turn off MathJax

Article Contents

Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2024 > 39(2): 114-128

CHEN Qi-bo. The Organizational Logic and Governance Effect of Vertical Management Reform of Environmental Protection[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2024, 39(2): 114-128.

Citation:

CHEN Qi-bo. The Organizational Logic and Governance Effect of Vertical Management Reform of Environmental Protection[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2024, 39(2): 114-128.

CHEN Qi-bo. The Organizational Logic and Governance Effect of Vertical Management Reform of Environmental Protection[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2024, 39(2): 114-128.

Citation:

PDF( 1844 KB)

The Organizational Logic and Governance Effect of Vertical Management Reform of Environmental Protection

CHEN Qi-bo

School of Public Policy and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China

Received Date: 2023-06-07
Available Online: 2024-04-11
Publish Date: 2024-03-28

Abstract

Abstract

As an important measure of environmental management system reform in China, the environmental management system in China has been changed from territorial management to vertical management in the province. Based on the theory of control rights, the theoretical analysis framework for vertical reform of environmental protection is constructed, and the governance effect and its influencing mechanism of environmental protection vertical reform are tested by using the panel data of prefecture-level cities from 2013 to 2021 and the multi-period difference-in-difference model. It is found that the vertical reform of environmental protection has shifted the control rights of municipal and county environmental protection departments at the organizational level, giving real authority to the vertical management of the upper and lower levels within the environmental protection departments, thus improving the enforcement of environmental law at the grass-roots level and reducing regional pollutant emissions. The dynamic effect analysis shows that the pollution reduction caused by vertical reform of environmental protection has good sustainability. Further analysis shows that environmental protection reform has a significant negative regulatory effect on financial pressure and official association to promote pollutant discharge, and the control effect on border pollution is more significant. The research findings provide theoretical and empirical evidence for how to effectively divide and cooperate between local governments and environmental protection departments, and between higher and lower environmental protection departments to ensure long-term stability of environmental governance.
- environmental management system,
- vertical management,
- governance effect,
- allocation of control rights,
- real authority,
- formal authority,
- environmental governance

FullText(HTML)

References(43)

References

[1]	周雪光, 练宏. 中国政府的治理模式: 一个"控制权"理论[J]. 社会学研究, 2012(5): 69-93, 243. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SHXJ201205004.htm
[2]	TIEBOUT C M. A pure theory of local expenditures[J]. Journal Political Economy, 1956, 64(5): 416-424. doi: 10.1086/257839
[3]	BESLEY T, COATE S. Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: a political economy approach[J]. Journal of Public Economics, 2003, 87(12): 2611-2637. doi: 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00141-X
[4]	MILLIMET D L. Assessing the empirical impact of environmental federalism[J]. Journal of Regional Science, 2003, 43(4) : 711-733. doi: 10.1111/j.0022-4146.2003.00317.x
[5]	STIGLER G. The tenable range of functions of local government[M]//Joint Economic Committee. Federal Expenditure Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, Washington D. C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1957: 213-219.
[6]	唐为. 分权、外部性与边界效应[J]. 经济研究, 2019(3): 103-118. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ201903008.htm
[7]	LIPSCOMB M, MOBARAK A M. Decentralization and pollution spillovers: evidence from the re-drawing of county borders in Brazil[J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2017, 84(1): 464-502. doi: 10.1093/restud/rdw023
[8]	OATES W E, PORTNEY P. Chapter 8-the political economy of environmental policy[J]. Handbook of Environmental Economics, 2003, 1(2): 325-354.
[9]	郭峰, 石庆玲. 官员更替、合谋震慑与空气质量的临时性改善[J]. 经济研究, 2017(7): 155-168. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ201707012.htm
[10]	周黎安. 晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作——兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因[J]. 经济研究, 2004(6): 33-40. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ200406003.htm
[11]	JIA R, NIE H. Decentralization, collusion, and coal mine deaths[J]. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2017, 99 (1): 105-118. doi: 10.1162/REST_a_00563
[12]	CHEN L, BARRY N. An institutionalized policy-making mechanism: China's return to techno-industrial policy[J]. Research Policy, 2016, 45(10): 2138-2152. doi: 10.1016/j.respol.2016.09.014
[13]	周黎安. 行政发包制[J]. 社会, 2014(6): 1-38. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SHEH201406001.htm
[14]	XU C. The fundamental institutions of China's reforms and development[J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 2011, 4: 1076-1151.
[15]	李萱, 沈晓悦. 地方环保体制的结构性问题及对策[J]. 行政管理改革, 2011(11): 50-53. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XZGL201111014.htm
[16]	鞠昌华. 环境保护垂直管理的探讨[J]. 环境保护, 2013(8): 56-57. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-HJBU201308021.htm
[17]	赵琳, 唐珏, 陈诗一. 环保管理体制垂直化改革的环境治理效应[J]. 世界经济文汇, 2019(2): 100-120. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SZWH201902006.htm
[18]	韩超, 孙晓琳, 李静. 环境规制垂直管理改革的减排效应——来自地级市环保系统改革的证据[J]. 经济学(季刊), 2021(1): 335-360. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJXU202101016.htm
[19]	张琦, 邹梦琪. 环境治理垂直改革的效果、基层机制与影响因素[J]. 经济研究, 2022(8): 172-190. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ202208012.htm
[20]	GROSSMAN S, HART O. The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical lateral integration[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4): 691-719. doi: 10.1086/261404
[21]	WILLIAMSON O. Comparative economic organization: the analysis of discrete structural alternatives[J]. Administrative Science Quarterly, 1991, 36(2): 269-296. doi: 10.2307/2393356
[22]	HART O, MOORE J. Property rights and the natue of the firm[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98(6): 1119-1158. doi: 10.1086/261729
[23]	HOLMSTROM B, MILGROM P. The Firm as an incentive system[J]. American Economic Review, 1994, 84(4): 972-991.
[24]	周雪光. 从"官吏分途"到"层级分流": 帝国逻辑下的中国官僚人事制度[J]. 社会, 2016(1): 1-33. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SHEH201601002.htm
[25]	姚东旻, 崔琳, 张鹏远, 等. 中国政府治理模式的选择与转换: 一个正式模型[J]. 社会, 2021(6): 41-74. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SHEH202106002.htm
[26]	陈那波, 陈永宏, 谭茼丹. 政府绩效评估中的"控制权"分配与行动逻辑[J]. 科研管理, 2022(5): 191-199. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-KYGL202205021.htm
[27]	练宏. 注意力分配——基于跨学科视角的理论述评[J]. 社会学研究, 2015(4): 215-241, 246. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SHXJ201504010.htm
[28]	练宏. 注意力竞争——基于参与观察与多案例的组织学分析[J]. 社会学研究, 2016(4): 1-26, 242. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SHXJ201604001.htm
[29]	练宏. 弱排名激励的社会学分析——以环保部门为例[J]. 中国社会科学, 2016(1): 82-99, 205. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZSHK201601005.htm
[30]	AGHION P, TIROLE J. Formal and real authority in organizations[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997, 105(1): 1-29.
[31]	BECK T, ROSS L, ALEXEY L. Big bad banks? the winners and losers from bank deregulation in the United States[J]. Journal of Finance, 2010, 65(5): 1637-1667.
[32]	温忠麟, 张雷, 侯杰泰, 等. 中介效应检验程序及其应用[J]. 心理学报, 2004(5): 614-620. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-XLXB200405016.htm
[33]	ANTWEILER W, COPELAND B, TAYLOR M. Is free trade good for the environment[J]. American Economic Review, 2001, 91(4): 877-908.
[34]	苏丹妮, 盛斌. 服务业外资开放如何影响企业环境绩效——来自中国的经验[J]. 中国工业经济, 2021(6): 61-79. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GGYY202106005.htm
[35]	GROSSMAN G, KRUEGER A. Economic growth and the environment[J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1995, 2(110): 353-377.
[36]	席鹏辉, 梁若冰, 谢贞发. 税收分成调整、财政压力与工业污染[J]. 世界经济, 2017(10): 170-192. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SJJJ201710009.htm
[37]	冯梦青, 于海峰. 财政分权、外商直接投资与大气环境污染[J]. 广东财经大学学报, 2018(3): 44-51. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SONG201803009.htm
[38]	郑思齐, 万广华, 孙伟增, 等. 公众诉求与城市环境治理[J]. 管理世界, 2013(6): 72-84. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GLSJ201306007.htm
[39]	包国宪, 关斌. 财政压力会降低地方政府环境治理效率吗——一个被调节的中介模型[J]. 中国人口·资源与环境, 2019(4): 38-48. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZGRZ201904005.htm
[40]	张莉, 徐现祥, 王贤彬. 地方官员合谋与土地违法[J]. 世界经济, 2011(3): 72-88. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SJJJ201103007.htm
[41]	齐杏发. 差序格局、关系网络与政府间运行机制[J]. 武汉大学学报: 哲学社会科学版, 2008(5): 670-675. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-WSLD200805012.htm
[42]	SILVA E C D, ZHU X. Emissions trading of global and local pollutants, pollution havens and free riding[J]. Journal of Environmental Economics & Management, 2009, 58(2): 169-182.
[43]	王岭, 刘相锋, 熊艳. 中央环保督察与空气污染治理——基于地级城市微观面板数据的实证分析[J]. 中国工业经济, 2019(10): 5-22. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-GGYY201910002.htm