Volume 35 Issue 1
May  2021
Turn off MathJax
Article Contents
DONG Zhu, ZHANG Xin. Accounting Conservatism and Corporate R & D Investment: Evidence from Chinese Capital Market[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(1): 101-112.
Citation: DONG Zhu, ZHANG Xin. Accounting Conservatism and Corporate R & D Investment: Evidence from Chinese Capital Market[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(1): 101-112.

Accounting Conservatism and Corporate R & D Investment: Evidence from Chinese Capital Market

  • Received Date: 2019-09-21
    Available Online: 2021-05-15
  • Publish Date: 2020-01-28
  • Using the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017, this paper investigates the impact of accounting conservatism on R & D investment, and further tests the role played by ownership, heterogeneous institutional investors and information transparency. The results show that the higher the accounting conservatism is, the less the R & D investment of enterprises is, indicating that accounting conservatism will restrain the R & D investment of enterprises. It is found through further tests based on the nature of ownership that accounting conservatism has a stronger inhibitory effect on R & D investment in non-state-owned enterprises than that in state-owned enterprises; while stable institutional investors and the improvement of enterprise information transparency can alleviate the negative impact of accounting conservatism on R & D investment. This study is of theoretically and practically significance for comprehensive understanding of the impact of accounting conservatism on enterprise investment activities and how to reduce the negative effect of accounting conservatism on R & D investment.
  • loading
  • [1]
    郭园园, 成力为. 外部融资渠道与企业异质性R&D投资[J]. 科学学研究, 2016(6): 887-895. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2053.2016.06.012
    [2]
    谢家智, 刘思亚, 李后建. 政治关联、融资约束与企业研发投入[J]. 财经研究, 2014(8): 81-93. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-CJYJ201408007.htm
    [3]
    孙晓华, 王昀, 徐冉. 金融发展、融资约束缓解与企业研发投资[J]. 科研管理, 2015(5): 47-54. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1001-8611.2015.05.014
    [4]
    李后建. 市场化、腐败与企业家精神[J]. 经济科学, 2013(1): 99-111. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJKX201301008.htm
    [5]
    刘斌, 吴娅玲. 会计稳健性与资本投资效率的实证研究[J]. 审计与经济研究, 2011(4): 60-68. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-SJYJ201104009.htm
    [6]
    张悦玫, 张芳, 李延喜. 会计稳健性、融资约束与投资效率[J]. 会计研究, 2017(9): 35-40. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2017.09.005
    [7]
    张悦玫, 张芳. 会计稳健性、投资效率与外部融资方式的实证研究[J]. 管理评论, 2019(4): 175-186. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZWGD201904062.htm
    [8]
    WATTS R L. Conservatism in accounting part I: explanations and implications[J]. Accounting horizons, 2003, 17(3): 207-221. doi: 10.2308/acch.2003.17.3.207
    [9]
    BASU S. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings[J]. Journal of accounting and economics, 1997, 24(1): 3-38. doi: 10.1016/S0165-4101(97)00014-1
    [10]
    张金鑫, 王逸. 会计稳健性与公司融资约束——基于两类稳健性视角的研究[J]. 会计研究, 2013(9): 44-50. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2013.09.006
    [11]
    AHMED A S. Accounting conservatism and board of director characteristics: an empirical analysis[J]. Journal of accounting and economics, 2007, 43: 411-437. doi: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2007.01.005
    [12]
    BUSHMAN R M. Capital allocation and timely accounting recognition of economic losses[J]. Journal of business finance &accounting, 2011, 38(1-2): 1-33. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1786249
    [13]
    杨丹, 王宁, 叶建明. 会计稳健性与上市公司投资行为——基于资产减值角度的实证分析[J]. 会计研究, 2011(3): 27-33. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2011.03.004
    [14]
    韩静, 陈志红, 杨晓星. 高管团队背景特征视角下的会计稳健性与投资效率关系研究[J]. 会计研究, 2014(12): 25-31. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1003-2886.2014.12.004
    [15]
    HU J, LI A Y, ZHANG F. Does accounting conservatism improve the corporate information environment?[J]. Journal of international accounting auditing &taxation, 2014, 23(1): 32-43.
    [16]
    张琛, 刘银国. 会计稳健性与自由现金流的代理成本: 基于公司投资行为的考察[J]. 管理工程学报, 2015(1): 98-105. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-6062.2015.01.013
    [17]
    ROYCHOWDHURY S. Discussion of: "acquisition profitability and timely loss recognition"by J. Francis and X. Martin[J]. Journal of accounting & economics, 2010, 49(1): 179-183. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410109000482
    [18]
    KRAVET T D. Accounting conservatism and managerial risk-taking: corporate acquisitions[J]. Journal of accounting & economics, 2014, 57(2-3): 218-240. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410114000159
    [19]
    GRAHAM J. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting[J]. Journal of accounting and economics, 2005, 40: 3-73. doi: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002
    [20]
    BABER W R, FAIRFIELD P M, HAGGARD J A. The effect of concern about reported income on discretionary spending decisions: the case of research and development[J]. Accounting review, 1991, 66(4): 818-829.
    [21]
    OSMA B G, YOUNG S. R&D expenditure and earnings targets[J]. European accounting review, 2009, 18(1): 7-32. doi: 10.1080/09638180802016718
    [22]
    钟宇翔, 吕怀立, 李婉丽. 管理层短视、会计稳健性与企业创新抑制[J]. 南开管理评论, 2017(6): 163-177. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1008-3448.2017.06.016
    [23]
    FUDENBERG DREW J T. A theory of income and dividend smoothing based on incumbency rents[J]. Journal of political economy, 1995, 103(1): 75-93. doi: 10.1086/261976
    [24]
    NARAYANAN M P. Managerial incentives for short-term results[J]. Journal of finance, 1985, 40: 1469-1484. doi: 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1985.tb02395.x
    [25]
    NOE T H, REBELLO M J. Renegotiation, investment horizons, and managerial discretion[J]. Journal of business, 1997, 70(3): 385-407. doi: 10.1086/209723
    [26]
    STEIN J. Takeover threats and managerial myopia[J]. Journal of political economy, 1988, 96: 61-80. doi: 10.1086/261524
    [27]
    BOLTON P, XIONG W, SCHEINKMAN J A. Executive compensation and short-termist behavior in speculative markets[J]. Review of economic studies, 2006, 73: 577-610. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00388.x
    [28]
    林毅夫, 李志赟. 政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J]. 经济研究, 2004(2): 17-27. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-JJYJ200402002.htm
    [29]
    杨兴全, 曾义. 现金持有能够平滑企业的研发投入吗?——基于融资约束与金融发展视角的实证研究[J]. 科研管理, 2014(7): 107-115. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-KYGL201407014.htm
    [30]
    张杰, 芦哲, 郑文平, 等. 融资约束、融资渠道与企业R&D投入[J]. 世界经济, 2012(10): 66-90.
    [31]
    DAVID P, YOSHIKAWA T, CHARI M D R, et al. Strategic investments in Japanese corporations: do foreign portfolio owners foster underinvestment or appropriate investment?[J]. Strategic management journal, 2006, 27(6): 591-600. doi: 10.1002/smj.523
    [32]
    WAHAL S, MCCONNELL J J. Do institutional investors exacerbate managerial myopia?[J]. Journal of corporate finance, 2000, 6: 307-329. doi: 10.1016/S0929-1199(00)00005-5
    [33]
    AGHION P, REENEN J V, ZINGALES L. Innovation and institutional ownership[J]. Cepr discussion papers, 2013, 103(1): 277-304. http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/aea/aer/2013/00000103/00000001/art00009
    [34]
    温军, 冯根福. 异质机构、企业性质与自主创新[J]. 经济研究, 2012(3): 53-64. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-5863.2012.03.024
    [35]
    KHAN M, WATTS R L. Estimation and empirical properties of a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism[J]. Journal of accounting & economics, 2009, 48(2): 132-150. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410109000445
    [36]
    牛建波, 吴超, 李胜楠. 机构投资者类型、股权特征和自愿性信息披露[J]. 管理评论, 2013, 25(3): 48-59. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.2095-3410.2013.03.008
    [37]
    HUTTON A P, MARCUS A J, TEHRANIAN H. Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk[J]. Journal of financial economics, 2009, 94(1): 67-86. doi: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.10.003
    [38]
    DECHOW P M, SLOAN R G, SWEENEY A P. Detecting earnings management[J]. Accounting review, 1995, 70(2): 193-225.
  • 加载中

Catalog

    通讯作者: 陈斌, bchen63@163.com
    • 1. 

      沈阳化工大学材料科学与工程学院 沈阳 110142

    1. 本站搜索
    2. 百度学术搜索
    3. 万方数据库搜索
    4. CNKI搜索

    Tables(7)

    Article Metrics

    Article Views(144) PDF Downloads(13) Cited by()
    Proportional views
    Related

    /

    DownLoad:  Full-Size Img  PowerPoint
    Return
    Return