Analysis of Platform Data-based Self-reference by Antitrust Law

LI Xin

Volume 38 Issue 1

Jan. 2023

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LI Xin. Analysis of Platform Data-based Self-reference by Antitrust Law[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(1): 101-111.

Citation:

LI Xin. Analysis of Platform Data-based Self-reference by Antitrust Law[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(1): 101-111.

LI Xin. Analysis of Platform Data-based Self-reference by Antitrust Law[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(1): 101-111.

Citation:

LI Xin. Analysis of Platform Data-based Self-reference by Antitrust Law[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(1): 101-111.

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Analysis of Platform Data-based Self-reference by Antitrust Law

LI Xin

School of Civil and Commercial Economic Law, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing 100088, China

Received Date: 2022-07-28
Available Online: 2023-03-09
Publish Date: 2023-01-28

Abstract

Abstract

Platform data-based self-preference is a new form of self-preference, which represents the behavior of platform enterprises to use the result of non-public data analysis of third-party sellers without permission toenhance the competitiveness of their own business. In practice, there are various manifestations, such as adjusting prices, copying and launching new products, and adjusting inventory. The use of non-public data of third-party sellers on the platform will have the effect of harming competition, which may violate the antitrust law. In the absence of uniform illegality standard and judgment precedent, the judgement of illegality of platform data-based self-preference should depend on the analysis of the data types, data attributes, purposes of data use, and the alternative channelsto compensate for competition damage.In order to remedy the competitive damage caused by the platformdata-based self-preference, the antitrust law enforcement agency should set up more specific remedies. In terms of behavioral remedies, the platform can be required to set up a data isolation mechanism, establish the principle of data minimization, set up consent rules for data use, and open some data to third-party sellers. When behavioral remedies are not effective or the platform has implemented data-based self-preference for many times, structural remedies such as divestiture the platformself-operated business line are applicable.
- platform,
- platform economy,
- data,
- self-preference,
- competition damage,
- antitrust,
- remedy

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References(21)

References

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