The Impact of Equity Pledge on the Control Rights and Business Performance of Private Enterprises in the Context of Stock Market Downturn

FENG Ke; LIU Dan

Volume 39 Issue 5

Sep. 2024

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FENG Ke, LIU Dan. The Impact of Equity Pledge on the Control Rights and Business Performance of Private Enterprises in the Context of Stock Market Downturn[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2024, 39(5): 55-71.

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FENG Ke, LIU Dan. The Impact of Equity Pledge on the Control Rights and Business Performance of Private Enterprises in the Context of Stock Market Downturn[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2024, 39(5): 55-71.

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The Impact of Equity Pledge on the Control Rights and Business Performance of Private Enterprises in the Context of Stock Market Downturn

FENG Ke,
LIU Dan

School of Economics, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China

Received Date: 2024-07-10
Available Online: 2024-11-08
Publish Date: 2024-09-28

Abstract

Abstract

With the continuous expansion of equity pledge scale, the risk of stock market in China continued to increase, which resulted in the equity pledge crisis in 2018. The stock price crash in 2018 was used as an exogenous quasi natural experiment, and a Logit-DID model was applied to investigate the impact of equity pledge accompanied by the stock market downturn on the control rights and business performance of private enterprises. It is found that when the stock price decreases, major shareholders without equity pledge would increase their holdings, thereby the likelihood of losing control rights reduced. However, if a company had equity pledge and reached a certain proportion, a decrease in stock price would increase the likelihood of losing control rights. The transfer of corporate control rights might be accompanied by future business performance losses. Besides, the "Relief" policy, accompanied by the transformation of a private enterprise's actual controller into state-owned capital, would result in more significant losses in corporate performance with managerial agency problem as mechanism. This conclusion has important implications for optimizing capital market regulatory enforcement, maintaining asset price stability, and protecting investors and listed companies.
- equity pledge,
- stock price crash,
- "Relief" policy,
- corporate control rights,
- business performance

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References(68)

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