Will the Group's Concentrated Liabilities Affect Corporate Innovation

XIE Huo-bao; DING Long-fei

Volume 34 Issue 4

May 2021

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XIE Huo-bao, DING Long-fei. Will the Group's Concentrated Liabilities Affect Corporate Innovation[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(4): 87-100.

Citation:

XIE Huo-bao, DING Long-fei. Will the Group's Concentrated Liabilities Affect Corporate Innovation[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(4): 87-100.

XIE Huo-bao, DING Long-fei. Will the Group's Concentrated Liabilities Affect Corporate Innovation[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(4): 87-100.

Citation:

XIE Huo-bao, DING Long-fei. Will the Group's Concentrated Liabilities Affect Corporate Innovation[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(4): 87-100.

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Will the Group's Concentrated Liabilities Affect Corporate Innovation

School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China

Received Date: 2018-12-18
Available Online: 2021-05-22
Publish Date: 2019-07-28

Abstract

Abstract

In this paper, the patent data of all A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2016 were used to study the impact of concentrated liabilities on the conglomerate's innovation input and innovation output. The results show that in the same conditions, the centralized liabilities can alleviate the financing constraints or aggravate the agency problems of the parent company, thus expanding the innovation investment, while the group's centralized liabilities can reduce the cash holding level or lead to the short-sightedness of the subsidiary managers, thus restraining innovation output. Extensive analysis shows that the effect of concentrated liabilities on the increase of innovation investment is more prominent in conglomerates with weaker external supervision and higher ratio of the subsidiaries holding cash; the guarantee of parent company to subsidiary can restrain the negative relation between concentrated debt and innovation output. This conclusion highlights the agency problem between the parent and subsidiary company from the perspective of enterprise boundary and supports the hypothesis that the conglomerate is the root of parasite.
- enterprise group,
- enterprise innovation,
- concentrated debt,
- innovation input,
- innovation output,
- enterprise boundary,
- two-tiered agency

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References(49)

References

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