A New Perspective for Contract Interpretation: An Analytical Framework Based on Transaction Cost Theory

HU Wei-qiang

Volume 34 Issue 3

May 2021

Turn off MathJax

Article Contents

Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2019 > 34(3): 102-112

HU Wei-qiang. A New Perspective for Contract Interpretation: An Analytical Framework Based on Transaction Cost Theory[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(3): 102-112.

Citation:

HU Wei-qiang. A New Perspective for Contract Interpretation: An Analytical Framework Based on Transaction Cost Theory[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(3): 102-112.

HU Wei-qiang. A New Perspective for Contract Interpretation: An Analytical Framework Based on Transaction Cost Theory[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(3): 102-112.

Citation:

PDF( 1001 KB)

A New Perspective for Contract Interpretation: An Analytical Framework Based on Transaction Cost Theory

HU Wei-qiang

School of Law, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100, China

Received Date: 2019-09-29
Available Online: 2021-05-27
Publish Date: 2019-05-28

Abstract

Abstract

Contracts are bound for incompleteness so that ex post interpretation and gap-filling are the job judges have to take. Traditionally, civil law jurisprudence lays its foundation on the parties' autonomy and takes the systematic consistency as the starting point from which a whole canon of interpretation rules has been developed. Based on transaction cost theory, through synthesizing of previous research and theories, an analytical framework consisting of three dimensions has been put forward. This framework is as follows: reducing transaction costs is the purpose of contract interpretation and the first dimension; allocating risks efficiently is the second dimension guiding judges to interpret the contract; administrative cost is the third dimension which constitutes the limits for contract interpretation.
- contract interpretation,
- transaction cost,
- risk allocation,
- administrative cost,
- judicial intervention,
- law application,
- law and economics

FullText(HTML)

References(30)

References

[1]	奥利弗·E·威廉姆森. 资本主义经济制度[M]. 段毅才, 王伟, 译. 北京: 商务印书馆, 2003.
[2]	WILLIAM SAMUELSON. Bargaining under asymmetric information[J]. Econometrica, 1984, 52(4): 995. doi: 10.2307/1911195
[3]	GEORGE A AKERLOF. The market for 'Lemons': quality uncertainty and market mechanism[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970, 84(3): 488. doi: 10.2307/1879431
[4]	理查德·A·波斯纳. 法律的经济分析(上)[M]. 蒋兆康, 译. 林毅夫, 校. 北京: 中国大百科全书出版社, 1997.
[5]	COHEN L. Holdouts and free riders[J]. The Journal of Legal Studies, 1991, 20(2), 351-362. doi: 10.1086/467890
[6]	OLIVER HAET, JOHN MOORE. Foundations of incomplete contracts[J]. The Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66(1): 115-138. doi: 10.1111/1467-937X.00080
[7]	休·柯林斯. 规制合同[M]. 郭小莉, 译. 北京: 中国人民大学出版社, 2014.
[8]	梁慧星. 民法解释学[M]. 4版. 北京: 法律出版社, 2015.
[9]	江平, 程合红, 申卫星. 论新合同法中的合同自由原则与诚实信用原则[J]. 政法论坛, 1999(1): 2-11. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZFLT199901000.htm
[10]	楼建波, 刘燕. 合同目由原则的限制及其与诚实信用原则的关系[J]. 中外法学, 1995(6): 35-45. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-WFXZ199506005.htm
[11]	徐国栋. 诚实信用原则的概念及其历史沿革[J]. 法学研究, 1989(4): 53-59. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-LAWS198904013.htm
[12]	徐国栋. 民法基本原则解释[M]. 北京: 北京大学出版社, 2013.
[13]	李·爱泼斯坦, 威廉·M·兰德斯, 理查德·A·波斯纳. 法官如何行为: 理性选择的理论和经验研究[M]. 黄韬, 译. 北京: 法律出版社, 2017.
[14]	GUIDO CALABRESI. Some thoughts on risk distribution and the law of torts[J]. Yale Law Journal, 1961, 70(4): 499-553. doi: 10.2307/794261
[15]	GUIDO CALABRESI, DOUGLAS MELAMED. Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: one view of the cathedral, harvard law review[J]. Harvard Law Review, 1972, 85(6): 1089. doi: 10.2307/1340059
[16]	ROBERT COOTER. Unity in tort, contract, and property: the model of precaution[J]. California Law Review, 1985, 73(1): 42. doi: 10.1002/9780470752135.ch5/pdf
[17]	NICHOLAS MERCURO, STEVEN G MEDEMA. Economics and the law: from Posner to Post-Modernism and Beyond[M]. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2006.
[18]	IAN AYRES, ROBERT GERTNER. Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: an economic theory of default rule[J]. Yale Legal Journal, 1989, 99(1): 87. doi: 10.2307/796722
[19]	RICHARD POSNER. Impossibility and related doctrines in contract law: an economic analysis[J]. Journal of Legal Studies, 1977, 6(1): 83. doi: 10.1086/467564
[20]	胡伟强. 违约救济方式的单方选择权[J]. 制度经济学研究, 2009(4): 70-80. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-ZDJJ200904006.htm
[21]	韩世远. 合同法总论[M]. 3版. 北京: 法律出版社, 2011.
[22]	HANS-BERND SCHAEFER, CLAUS OTT. The economic analysis of civil law[M]. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004.
[23]	理查德·A·波斯纳. 法律的经济分析(下)[M]. 蒋兆康, 译. 林毅夫, 校. 北京: 中国大百科全书出版社, 1997.
[24]	姚明斌. 违约金论[M]. 北京: 中国法制出版社, 2018.
[25]	王洪亮. 违约金功能定位的反思[J]. 法律科学, 2014(2): 115-125. https://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTOTAL-DOUB201402012.htm
[26]	姚明斌. 违约金司法酌减的规范构成[J]. 法学, 2014(1): 130-141. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1674-9502.2014.01.020
[27]	王文宇. 从商法特色论民法典编纂——兼论台湾地区民商合一法制[J]. 清华法学, 2015(6): 62-78. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1673-9280.2015.06.004
[28]	陈怀峰, 赵江风. 违约金数额司法调整的适用问题[J]. 政法论丛, 2011(6): 113-120. doi: 10.3969/j.issn.1002-6274.2011.06.015
[29]	斯蒂夫·G·梅德玛. 捆住市场的手: 如何驯服利己主义[M]. 启蒙编译所, 译. 北京: 中央编译出版社, 2014.
[30]	拉斯·C·诺思. 制度、制度变迁与经济绩效[M]. 杭行, 译. 上海: 格致出版社, 上海人民出版社, 2014.