How Does Selective Industrial Policy Affect Business Performance?Empirical Evidence from the Qualification of High-tech Enterprises

QIU Yang-dong

Volume 35 Issue 3

May 2021

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2020 > 35(3): 70-83

QIU Yang-dong. How Does Selective Industrial Policy Affect Business Performance?Empirical Evidence from the Qualification of High-tech Enterprises[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(3): 70-83.

Citation:

QIU Yang-dong. How Does Selective Industrial Policy Affect Business Performance?Empirical Evidence from the Qualification of High-tech Enterprises[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(3): 70-83.

Citation:

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How Does Selective Industrial Policy Affect Business Performance?Empirical Evidence from the Qualification of High-tech Enterprises

QIU Yang-dong

Institute of Industrial Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China

Received Date: 2019-12-04
Available Online: 2021-05-13
Publish Date: 2020-06-28

Abstract

Abstract

Taking the high-level enterprise qualification policy as a quasi-natural experiment, the paper aims to test the effect and micro-mechanism of high-level enterprise qualification policy on corporate performance through a progressive double difference model. It is found that compared with non-high-tech enterprises, the high-tech qualification certification policy significantly inhibits the performance of high-tech enterprises; however, the direction and degree of high-tech qualification certification policies affecting corporate performance also depend on the regulatory role of external markets and the government; excessive regional competition and excessive government intervention are not conducive to improving the effectiveness of high-level enterprise qualification policy; on the contrary, increasing the degree of regional marketization and industrial marketization will help to better exert the policy effects of high-level enterprise qualification policy. It is also concluded that the implementation of the high-enterprise qualification policy on the one hand led to the"high investment and low efficiency"problem of high-tech enterprises, and on the other hand caused the R & D manipulation behavior of high-tech enterprises. The findings not only reveal the current dilemma of the implementation of selective industrial policies, but also clarify the mechanism that may cause distortion effects of selective industrial policies, which has important implications for further improving China's industrial policy formulation.
- industrial policy,
- selective industrial policy,
- qualification identification,
- corporate performance,
- R & D manipulation,
- investment efficiency,
- high technology,
- marketization

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References(34)

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