Business Environment, Tax Efforts of Local Government and Corporate Tax Compliance

TAO Dong-jie; CHEN Zheng-hong; XU Yang

Volume 39 Issue 2

Mar. 2024

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2024 > 39(2): 29-43

TAO Dong-jie, CHEN Zheng-hong, XU Yang. Business Environment, Tax Efforts of Local Government and Corporate Tax Compliance[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2024, 39(2): 29-43.

Citation:

TAO Dong-jie, CHEN Zheng-hong, XU Yang. Business Environment, Tax Efforts of Local Government and Corporate Tax Compliance[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2024, 39(2): 29-43.

Citation:

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Business Environment, Tax Efforts of Local Government and Corporate Tax Compliance

School of Finance and Public Administration, Hubei University of Economics, Wuhan 430205, China

Received Date: 2023-10-05
Available Online: 2024-04-11
Publish Date: 2024-03-28

Abstract

Abstract

The optimization of the business environment can change the game balance between the government and the market and improve the tax efforts of government and fiscal capacity. This paper constructed a "government-enterprise" two-sector Stackelberg game model as a theoretical analysis framework. Then, using China's Administrative Approval Reform as a "quasi natural experiment" for local governments to improve the business environment, matching the Chinese industrial enterprise database, this paper has investigated the causality of the relationship between improvement of the business environment and local fiscal capacity. It is found that the optimization of the business environment represented by the reform of the administrative approval system contributes to the improvement of local financial capacity, which is reflected in the significant improvement of corporate tax compliance. The effect is more pronounced in corporate under the jurisdiction of local tax bureaus, private corporate, and small-scale corporate, and proves the theoretical mechanism that the optimization of business environment affects local governments' tax efforts and then improves corporate tax compliance. The conclusions of this paper has profound policy enlightenment for improving the country's fiscal capacity from the path of improving the business environment.
- business environment,
- Administrative Approval Reform,
- local fiscal capacity,
- corporate tax compliance

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References(38)

References

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