Ultimate Control Allocation and Refinancing: Managerial Entrenchment or Interest Encroachment

JIAN Guan-qun

Volume 34 Issue 6

May 2021

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JIAN Guan-qun. Ultimate Control Allocation and Refinancing: Managerial Entrenchment or Interest Encroachment[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(6): 50-63.

Citation:

JIAN Guan-qun. Ultimate Control Allocation and Refinancing: Managerial Entrenchment or Interest Encroachment[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(6): 50-63.

JIAN Guan-qun. Ultimate Control Allocation and Refinancing: Managerial Entrenchment or Interest Encroachment[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(6): 50-63.

Citation:

JIAN Guan-qun. Ultimate Control Allocation and Refinancing: Managerial Entrenchment or Interest Encroachment[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2019, 34(6): 50-63.

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Ultimate Control Allocation and Refinancing: Managerial Entrenchment or Interest Encroachment

JIAN Guan-qun

School of Economics and Management, Gansu University of Political Science and Law, Lanzhou 730070, China

Received Date: 2019-07-23
Available Online: 2021-05-27
Publish Date: 2021-05-27

Abstract

Abstract

The influence of two kinds of agency problems in ultimate control allocation on the choice of refinancing mode needs to be reunderstood in the context of complex network relationship. On the basis of dual control chain, this paper focuses on the new calculation of the holistic evaluation of ultimate control allocation and explores the transmission mechanism of its choice of refinancing mode through the managerial entrenchment. The results show that: the higher index of ultimate control allocation, the more inclined the company is to choose convertible bonds, followed by corporate bonds; the lower index of ultimate control allocation, the more inclined the company is to choose private placement; the allocation of ultimate control has negative influence on the managerial entrenchment; the higher the managerial entrenchment, the more inclined the company is to choose private placement, but it is not sensitive to the choice between convertible bonds and bond financing. In addition, managerial entrenchment has partial intermediary effect in the relationship between ultimate control allocation and the choice of refinancing mode. Further study shows that the reason of partial intermediary effect is that the tunneling of the ultimate shareholders have an impact on the refinancing decision. The purpose of this study is to provide a new solution for refinancing alienation behavior from the root, to reveal the dynamic inter-relationship between the two kinds of agency problems, and to provide the target basis for the optimal design of the rights of ultimate control allocation.
- ultimate control right,
- ultimate control allocation,
- refinancing,
- refinancing method,
- managerial entrenchment,
- interest encroachment,
- convertible bonds,
- private placement

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References(39)

References

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