Business Cycle, Market Power and Trade Barriers Against China

ZHAO Wen-xia

Volume 35 Issue 4

May 2021

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ZHAO Wen-xia. Business Cycle, Market Power and Trade Barriers Against China[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(4): 20-33.

Citation:

ZHAO Wen-xia. Business Cycle, Market Power and Trade Barriers Against China[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(4): 20-33.

ZHAO Wen-xia. Business Cycle, Market Power and Trade Barriers Against China[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(4): 20-33.

Citation:

ZHAO Wen-xia. Business Cycle, Market Power and Trade Barriers Against China[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2020, 35(4): 20-33.

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Business Cycle, Market Power and Trade Barriers Against China

ZHAO Wen-xia

Research Center for Urban Economies, Tianjin Academy of Social Sciences, Tianjin 300191, China

Received Date: 2020-05-07
Available Online: 2021-05-08
Publish Date: 2020-08-28

Abstract

Abstract

In recent years, there are increasing uncertainties in the world economy, and significantly increasing trade barriers worldwide. Based on the panel data of disaggregated product level(HS6) between1988 and 2018, this paper analyzes the impact of business cycle and market power on trade barriers against China. It is found that tariff and non-tariff barriers have different characteristics, among which tariff barriers show significant pro-cyclicality, while non-tariff barriers do not. Group regressions show that in the period of economic prosperity, low-income countries tend to raise tariffs level on China, while high-income countries tend to increase non-tariff barriers against China; in the period of economic downturn, all countries tend to increase the probability of countervailing barriers against China. In addition, the findings indicate that market power enhances the non-tariff barriers and drives the pro-cyclicality of tariffs. This study puts forward a new perspective to understand the cyclicity of trade barriers, which presents some enlightenment to China's trade policy-making under the background of deglobalization.
- trade with China,
- business cycle,
- deglobalization,
- market power,
- trade barriers,
- tariff barriers,
- non-tariff barriers

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References(32)

References

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