On the Impact of the Founding Shareholders' Control Right on the Shadow Banking of Non-financial Enterprises

WANG Lei; PANG Shu-hui; YU Wen-cheng

Volume 37 Issue 6

Nov. 2022

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2022 > 37(6): 50-61

WANG Lei, PANG Shu-hui, YU Wen-cheng. On the Impact of the Founding Shareholders' Control Right on the Shadow Banking of Non-financial Enterprises[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2022, 37(6): 50-61.

Citation:

WANG Lei, PANG Shu-hui, YU Wen-cheng. On the Impact of the Founding Shareholders' Control Right on the Shadow Banking of Non-financial Enterprises[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2022, 37(6): 50-61.

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On the Impact of the Founding Shareholders' Control Right on the Shadow Banking of Non-financial Enterprises

1.
School of Economics, Ocean University of China, Qingdao 266100
2.
School of Economics and Management, Qingdao Agricultural University, Qingdao 266109, China

Received Date: 2022-05-11
Available Online: 2023-01-13
Publish Date: 2022-11-28

Abstract

Abstract

Founding shareholders with dual roles of shareholders and entrepreneurs may exhibit different shareholder governance behaviours in their participation in corporate governance. Samples of non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2007-2019 are selected to empirically analyse the effect of different types of control of founding shareholders on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises based on role theory. It is found that the control power of founding shareholders in the enterprise is negatively related to the scale of shadow banking of non-financial enterprises, and the actual control power with entrepreneurial role is more inhibitory to the shadow banking of enterprises than the nominal control power reflecting the role of shareholders; the higher actual control power of the founding shareholders will inhibit the scale of shadow banking of enterprises by reducing the risk tolerance of enterprises. Further research shows that the inhibiting effect of founding shareholders on the shadow banking of non-financial enterprises is more effective in regions with relatively high marketisation, in the East of China and among large-scale enterprises. It is therefore recommended to focus on and guarantee the unique governance of founding shareholders on excessive corporate financialisation, to address the risk-taking capacity of enterprises, to improve corporate risk management systems, and to differentiate regulation of financial investment behaviour of enterprises of different sizes and in different regions.
- founding shareholder,
- control power,
- non-financial enterprise,
- shadow banking,
- risk tolerance

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References(31)

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