A Comprehensive Construction of Cordial and Clean Government-Business Relationship from the Incentive Compatibility Perspective: The Institutional Collective Action Framework

LIANG Ping-han; ZHAO Yu-lan

Volume 38 Issue 2

Mar. 2023

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2023 > 38(2): 75-87

LIANG Ping-han, ZHAO Yu-lan. A Comprehensive Construction of Cordial and Clean Government-Business Relationship from the Incentive Compatibility Perspective: The Institutional Collective Action Framework[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(2): 75-87.

Citation:

LIANG Ping-han, ZHAO Yu-lan. A Comprehensive Construction of Cordial and Clean Government-Business Relationship from the Incentive Compatibility Perspective: The Institutional Collective Action Framework[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(2): 75-87.

Citation:

LIANG Ping-han, ZHAO Yu-lan. A Comprehensive Construction of Cordial and Clean Government-Business Relationship from the Incentive Compatibility Perspective: The Institutional Collective Action Framework[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(2): 75-87.

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A Comprehensive Construction of Cordial and Clean Government-Business Relationship from the Incentive Compatibility Perspective: The Institutional Collective Action Framework

Sun Yat-sen University, Guangzhou 510275, China

Received Date: 2023-01-31
Available Online: 2023-07-07
Publish Date: 2023-03-28

Abstract

Abstract

In order to build a cordial and clean government-business relationship with "two healthy" as the target, it is urgent to clarify the nature of government-business relationship and the underlying logic of government-business interaction. This paper argues that the cordial and clean government-business relationship is a stable state of benign interaction, and the key to building and maintaining this state is to achieve incentive compatibility between government and business. Thus, this paper proposes an institutional collective action framework to reach a consensus of interests between government and business in three dimensions: economic embedding, political absorption, and legal regulation. This paper takes the cohesion of common interests and institutional consensus, as well as the construction of trust relationship, between government and business, as the analytical path. We explore the practice strategies for the comprehensive construction of the cordial and clean relationship from cultivating trust, transforming institutional advantages, restraining political power, and streamlining inter-governmental relationship. Finally, we also explore the long-term mechanism for the comprehensive consolidation of the cordial and clean relationship in terms of institutionalized benefit distribution mechanism and guarantee mechanism.
- government-business relationship,
- institutional consensus,
- trust mechanism,
- collective action,
- business environment,
- ncentive compatibility

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References(55)

References

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