Can Civil Liability Deter Securities Market Misconducts: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Analysis Based on the Judgments of Representative Litigation

XU Wen-ming

Volume 37 Issue 2

Mar. 2022

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2022 > 37(2): 100-112

XU Wen-ming. Can Civil Liability Deter Securities Market Misconducts: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Analysis Based on the Judgments of Representative Litigation[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2022, 37(2): 100-112.

Citation:

XU Wen-ming. Can Civil Liability Deter Securities Market Misconducts: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Analysis Based on the Judgments of Representative Litigation[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2022, 37(2): 100-112.

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Can Civil Liability Deter Securities Market Misconducts: A Quasi-Natural Experiment Analysis Based on the Judgments of Representative Litigation

XU Wen-ming

School of Law and Economics, China University of Political Science and Law, Beijing 100088, China

Received Date: 2021-12-13
Available Online: 2022-04-24
Publish Date: 2022-03-28

Abstract

Abstract

"Law Matters Hypothesis" and "Enforcement Matters Hypothesis" have been heatedly debated in law and finance scholarship in recent years. With the registration reform and 2019 revision of Securities Law in China issued, the multi-level representative litigation and the specialization of Chinese courts in financial disputes adjudication have de jure increased the intensity of private enforcement, but it is uncertain whether the judicial judgments can furthermore increase the deterrence of securities misconducts. Using the exogenous shock brought about by the first judgment of securities representative litigation to test the aforementioned hypotheses, the event studies find that the portfolio of stocks issued by listed companies committing securities misconducts shows significant and negative abnormal return after the disclosure of the first-instance judgment of "Wuyang Case"; at the same time, it is estimated that there is a negative correlation between the abnormal return and the judicial quality of the province (city) where the listed company is located. The empirical research provides supporting evidence for the "Enforcement Matters Hypothesis", and has important implications for the "zero tolerance" policy for securities violations.
- civil liability,
- representative litigation,
- event studies,
- judicial judgment,
- quasi-natural experiment,
- stock market,
- illegal act

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References(37)

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