Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge and Strategic Disclosure of Digital Transformation Information: From the Perspective of Information Communication and Information Manipulation

ZHU Jie; SU Ya-min

Volume 38 Issue 5

Sep. 2023

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Article Navigation > Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics > 2023 > 38(5): 75-95

ZHU Jie, SU Ya-min. Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge and Strategic Disclosure of Digital Transformation Information: From the Perspective of Information Communication and Information Manipulation[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(5): 75-95.

Citation:

ZHU Jie, SU Ya-min. Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge and Strategic Disclosure of Digital Transformation Information: From the Perspective of Information Communication and Information Manipulation[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(5): 75-95.

Citation:

ZHU Jie, SU Ya-min. Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge and Strategic Disclosure of Digital Transformation Information: From the Perspective of Information Communication and Information Manipulation[J]. Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics, 2023, 38(5): 75-95.

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Controlling Shareholders' Equity Pledge and Strategic Disclosure of Digital Transformation Information: From the Perspective of Information Communication and Information Manipulation

ZHU Jie,
SU Ya-min

School of Management, South-Central Minzu University, Wuhan 430073, China

Received Date: 2023-06-14
Available Online: 2023-11-28
Publish Date: 2023-09-28

Abstract

Abstract

Whether there is strategic behavior in the information disclosure of digital transformation by listed companies is an important issue that is highly concerned by the practical community but relatively overlooked by the academic community. Using data from A-share listed companies in China from 2007 to 2020, this study explores the motivation for information disclosure of digital transformation, and strategic disclosure behavior of listed companies caused by the controlling shareholders' equity pledge. It is found that listed companies with controlling shareholders' equity pledges will increase information disclosure of digital transformation in their annual reports in order to achieve the goal of stock price stability. Therefore, information communication and manipulation both constitute the motivation for companies with equity pledge to increase information disclosure of digital transformation. However, companies with equity pledge are more likely to strategically disclose digital transformation information due to motives for information manipulation. The manifestation is that the higher the degree of equity pledge by controlling shareholders and the higher the risk of control transfer, the higher the degree of exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information in annual reports of listed companies under the motivation for information manipulation. It is found through economic consequence tests that the exaggerated disclosure of digital transformation information by companies with equity pledge can to some extent achieve the goal of stock price stability and alleviate the risk of stock price collapse. However, this exaggerated disclosure behavior will reduce the company's future market and operational performance, leading to greater economic losses. Heterogeneity tests indicate that the governance of institutional investor, creditor, and internal shareholder is effective measures to suppress the exaggerated information disclosure of digital transformation in companies with equity pledge. The research conclusions enrich the research in the field of strategic disclosure of non-financial information in annual reports, and have practical significance for guiding accounting information users to reasonably identify potential information risks in information disclosure of digital transformation.
- controlling shareholder,
- equity pledge,
- digital transformation,
- information disclosure,
- strategic disclosure,
- information communication,
- information manipulation

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References(45)

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