Which Weighs in Selection of Judges, Education Background or Profession: Evidence from the Improvement of Judicial Efficiency
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摘要: 尽管中国是一个成文法国家，但由于书面法律的不完备，拥有相当自由裁量权的法官的素质高低对司法效率有着直接且重要的影响。利用中国高级人民法院院长与辖区法院匹配的数据，研究发现: 法官的专业背景显著影响了以结案率来衡量的司法效率，在由毕业于法学专业的法官任高院院长的地区，当地法院的结案率要比其他地区高约2.5个百分点；但法官有更高的学历却并未显著提高司法效率。使用基层法院法官与微观案件匹配数据的研究也发现，法官学历的高低并未显著影响以审判时间衡量的司法效率。Abstract: Although China is a country with statute laws, due to the incompleteness of written laws, the quality of judges with considerable discretion has a direct and important impact on judicial efficiency. Using the data of the chief justices of Higher People's Court in China, this paper finds that the professional background of judges has significantly affected the judicial efficiency measured by the resolution rate; the resolution rate of the courts whose chief justices of higher people's court graduated from the law school is about 2.5 percentage points higher than that in other regions; however, the higher education level of judges has not significantly improved judicial efficiency. By using the data of judges at grassroots level courts, this paper also finds that the education level of judges has little significant effect on the trial time of the case.
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Key words:
- judge /
- education background /
- profession /
- judicial efficiency /
- resolution rate /
- law and economics
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表 1 各变量描述性统计
变量 均值 标准差 最小值 最大值 观测值 结案率 0.947 0.046 0.828 1.013 84 最高学历 2.728 0.840 1 4 92 全日制学历 2.543 1.083 1 5 92 法学 0.489 0.503 0 1 92 男性 0.924 0.267 0 1 92 年龄 54.163 3.757 43 60 92 任期 7.484 3.934 1.2 19.8 89 初任职法院 0.239 0.429 0 1 92 人均GDP 2.164 1.511 0.335 6.933 84 每万人律师数 1.700 2.169 0.222 11.369 84 
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表 2 法官的学历和专业对结案率的影响
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) education -0.011* -0.012* -0.011* -0.002 -0.004 0.000 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) major 0.027*** 0.024** 0.025** 0.025*** 0.022** 0.021* (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) male 0.018 0.014 0.014 0.009 (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) age -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) tenure -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) experience 0.009 0.008 0.013 0.010 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) pergdp 0.003 0.003 (0.004) (0.004) lawyer 0.004*** 0.005*** (0.002) (0.002) year 控制 控制 控制 控制 控制 控制 R2 0.221 0.250 0.307 0.193 0.220 0.280 观测值 84 84 84 84 84 84 注：***、**、*分别表示1%、5%和10%的显著性水平；括号中的数值是稳健性标准差。表 3、表 4同
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表 3 法官的学历和专业对结案率的影响：删除任期未满2年和未卸任样本
删除任期未满2年的样本 删除尚未卸任的样本 (1) (2) (3) (4) education -0.012*(0.006) -0.001(0.005) -0.018**(0.007) -0.003(0.006) major 0.025**(0.011) 0.021*(0.011) 0.026**(0.013) 0.023*(0.013) male 0.029*(0.016) 0.025(0.016) -0.001(0.020) -0.007(0.018) age -0.001(0.001) -0.000(0.001) -0.001(0.001) -0.001(0.001) tenure -0.000(0.002) -0.000(0.002) -0.000(0.002) 0.000(0.002) experience 0.020(0.013) 0.022(0.014) 0.011(0.016) 0.015(0.018) pergdp 0.003(0.004) 0.003(0.004) 0.004(0.005) 0.002(0.006) lawyer 0.005**(0.002) 0.005**(0.002) 0.004*(0.002) 0.004(0.003) year 控制 控制 控制 控制 R2 0.348 0.312 0.336 0.267 观察值 77 77 58 58
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表 4 法官的学历和专业对结案率的影响：面板数据回归
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) education -0.008* -0.008* -0.004 0.001 0.000 0.002 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) major 0.012** 0.013* 0.013* 0.011* 0.011* 0.013* (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) male 0.021** 0.018** 0.018** 0.016* (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) age 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) experience 0.013 0.017* 0.014 0.017** (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) pergdp 0.005* 0.005* (0.003) (0.003) lawyer 0.005*** 0.006*** (0.001) (0.001) year 控制 控制 控制 控制 控制 控制 R2 0.205 0.220 0.274 0.197 0.212 0.273 观测值 354 354 354 354 354 354
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表 5 法官学历对司法效率的影响：来自基层人民法院法官的证据
受理-宣判时间
(1)受理-开庭时间
(2)开庭-宣判时间
(3)master -3.760(3.421) -1.905(4.008) 1.839(3.031) male 3.014(3.510) -0.419(3.252) 1.180(2.200) age -1.0856***(0.304) -0.1795196 -0.841***(0.182) experience 0.454**(0.187) 0.226(0.219) 0.311**(0.122) defendant -8.499**(3.429) -12.379***(3.034) 3.783*(2.237) simple -86.432***(3.145) -82.248***(3.384) -3.903**(1.949) complexity 31.64***(6.216) 7.319(5.472) 28.891***(3.901) year 控制 控制 控制 R2 0.573 0.601 0.204 观测值 1115 847 847
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