地方政府专项债券对民间投资的影响研究

龙小燕; 赵全厚; 梁城城

地方政府专项债券对民间投资的影响研究

1.
中国财政科学研究院金融中心，北京 100142
2.
中国宏观经济研究院投资研究所，北京 100038

基金项目:

中国财政科学研究院2019年度招标课题 2019040404

详细信息

作者简介:
龙小燕(1976-), 女, 河北张家口人, 中国财政科学研究院金融中心副研究员, 博士

赵全厚(1965-), 男, 山西忻州人, 中国财政科学研究院金融中心主任, 研究员, 博士生导师

梁城城(1989-), 男, 湖北十堰人, 中国宏观经济研究院投资研究所助理研究员, 博士

中图分类号: F812.5
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- 被引次数: 0
出版历程
- 收稿日期: 2020-05-18
- 网络出版日期: 2021-04-29
- 刊出日期: 2020-10-28

On the Impact of Local Government Special Bonds on Private Investment

1.
Chinese Academy of Fiscal Science, Beijing 100142
2.
Chinese Macroeconomic Research Academy, Beijing 100038, China

摘要

摘要: 基于地方政府债务增长与民间投资的数理模型, 利用省级层面的宏观数据分析地方政府专项债券发行对民间投资的影响。研究发现地方政府债务总体而言会抑制民间投资, 但考虑专项债政策的影响后, 专项债对民间投资并没有显著的线性关系; 且专项债规模低于一定水平时会拉动民间投资水平, 超过最优规模则会对民间投资产生抑制作用, 一般债券与民间投资存在类似的非线性关系, 两者的拐点分别是22.68%和29.95%。此外, 专项债券、一般债券对不同类别的民间投资水平存在异质性影响。当前应根据地方的经济实力, 合理安排地方政府专项债券和一般债券的规模, 缩小地方政府债务限额和余额的差额, 并通过改善宏观经济政策环境促进民间投资水平的提升。
- 政府债务 /
- 地方政府债务 /
- 专项债券 /
- 一般债券 /
- 民间投资 /
- 私人投资
Abstract: Based on the mathematical model of local government debt growth and private investment, this paper analyzed the impact of the issuance of local government special bond on private investment by using macro data at the provincial level. The results show that the local government debt in general would inhibit private investment, but after considering the impact of special debt policy, the special debt has no significant linear relationship with private investment; when the scale of special debt is lower than a certain level, it will stimulate private investment; when exceeding the optimal scale, it inhibits private investment. There is a similar nonlinear relationship between general bond and private investment, at an inflection point 22. 68%and 29. 95% respectively. In addition, special bonds and general bonds have heterogeneous effects on different types of private investment. At present, according to the local economic strength, the government should reasonably arrange the scale of local government special bonds and general bonds, reasonably reduce the difference in debt limit and balance between local government, and improve the macroeconomic policy environment to promote the level of private investment.
- government debt /
- local government debt /
- special bond /
- general bond /
- social investment /
- private investment

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图 1 地方政府债务水平与民间投资之间的关系

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表 1 变量的描述性统计结果

变量名称	平均值	标准差	最小值	中位数	最大值
民间投资比重	67.83	11.27	21.88	69.26	87.34
政府债务/GDP	0.286	0.154	0.0500	0.253	0.947
专项债/GDP	0.096 0	0.053 0	0.003 00	0.090 0	0.357
一般债/GDP	0.181	0.108	0.048 0	0.151	0.560
ln(经济开放度)	2.752	2.033	-2.160	2.708	7.491
ln(政府规模)	2.374	0.260	1.789	2.360	3.124
ln(人均GDP)	10.73	0.450	9.482	10.68	11.85
城市人口密度	2 825	1 168	764	2 626	5 821
城镇化	56.14	12.89	27.74	54.34	89.60
企业税收负担	1.247	0.859	0.334	1.005	4.744

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表 2 专项债券政策实施对民间投资的影响

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)
L.民间投资	0.656 9^***	0.652 1^***	0.650 3^***
	(0.093 2)	(0.096 1)	(0.096 2)
政府债务占比	-10.417 7^***	-10.125 7^***	-10.058 6^***
	(3.607 1)	(3.707 0)	(3.743 5)
D		0.000 8
		(0.001 3)
D×政府债务占比			0.001 8
			(0.002 5)
ln(经济开放度)	3.134 6^*	3.091 1^*	3.077 0^*
	(1.764 8)	(1.775 7)	(1.780 3)
ln(政府规模)	-0.653 6^**	-0.696 8^**	-0.735 9^**
	(2.922 1)	(3.076 3)	(3.120 5)
ln(人均GDP)	5.083 2^**	5.217 8^***	5.319 2^***
	(4.474 8)	(4.494 7)	(4.506 6)
人口密度	0.000 9^***	0.000 9^***	0.000 9^***
	(0.000 8)	(0.000 8)	(0.000 8)
城镇化率	-0.116 7	-0.129 1	-0.131 4
	(0.128 7)	(0.133 7)	(0.132 7)
税收负担	-1.591 3	-1.498 6	-1.473 6
	(1.536 2)	(1.542 8)	(1.551 0)
AR(1)	0.001 0	0.015 5	0.077 4
AR(2)	0.721 0	0.247 5	0.625 9
Sargan检验	0.123 3	0.146 7	0.074 9
注：^*、^、^*分别代表 1%、5%、10%的显著性水平，各回归系数括号内为稳健性回归标准误。下表同。

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表 3 专项债券和一般债券规模对民间投资的影响

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
L.民间投资	0.402 3^***	0.269 1	0.352 2^**	0.352 2^**
	(0.079 9)	(0.171 6)	(0.139 6)	(0.139 6)
special	14.381 9	229.450 9^*
	(36.743 3)	(118.277 8)
special_sq		-505.826 8^*
		(273.632 3)
ordinary			-25.835 5	43.979 4^**
			(38.712 0)	(88.242 4)
ordinary_sq				-73.418 5^*
				(101.214 7)
ln(经济开放度)	1.638 3	1.285 4	2.665 3	2.738 1
	(4.352 1)	(4.363 0)	(4.186 7)	(4.116 7)
ln(政府规模)	-1.277 2	-5.267 4	-1.200 2	-1.486 9
	(6.323 7)	(7.023 7)	(5.399 2)	(5.547 5)
ln(人均GDP)	-1.258 5	11.127 5	-6.895 3	-8.329 1
	(7.708 3)	(10.103 3)	(10.683 8)	(12.725 9)
人口密度	0.000 0	0.001 0	-0.000 1	-0.000 2
	(0.001 1)	(0.001 3)	(0.001 1)	(0.001 2)
城镇化率	-0.137 9	-1.010 0	-0.262 6	-0.307 0
	(0.470 1)	(0.671 8)	(0.470 4)	(0.439 7)
税收负担	-1.291 2	0.276 9	-1.166 0	-1.255 7
	(1.469 6)	(2.268 8)	(1.548 1)	(1.640 4)
AR(1)	0.029 0	0.135 0	0.070 2	0.088 3
AR(2)	0.191 1	0.278 9	0.212 3	0.635 9
Sargan检验	0.233 2	0.152 1	0.118 7	0.083 2

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表 4 专项债对不同类别的民间投资的影响

民间投资类别	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
民间投资类别	个体	股份	集体	联营	内资	私营	有限	其他
L.个体	0.413 1^***
	(0.053 7)
L.股份		-0.002 8
		(0.121 7)
L.集体			0.382 3^***
			(0.051 6)
L.联营				0.192 8^***
				(0.051 8)
L.内资					-2.797 5^*
					(1.519 5)
L.私营						0.270 5
						(0.173 5)
L.有限							-0.068 8
							(0.154 3)
L.其他								0.085 7
								(0.145 9)
special	-13.002 1	-2.112 4	28.108 0^***	5.388 7^**	216.674 8	-43.012 4	399.893 9^***	-18.471 5
	(15.309 5)	(4.098 1)	(10.106 9)	(2.360 1)	(314.095 6)	(97.376 5)	(116.032 2)	(23.831 1)
special_sq	29.968 0	-3.284 5	-66.783 1^***	-12.564 6^**	-218.009 6	135.558 5	-879.038 6^***	13.921 4
	(26.822 8)	(6.650 6)	(23.176 9)	(4.985 4)	(527.120 6)	(236.933 6)	(204.143 0)	(51.670 6)
控制变量	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AR(1)	0.073 0	0.131 0	0.080 2	0.153 3	0.100 9	0.153 1	0.089 0	0.067 2
AR(2)	0.307 1	0.827 3	0.258 3	0.460 2	0.237 1	0.460 4	0.885 2	0.234 8
Sargan检验	0.121 1	0.227 6	0.296 1	0.140 9	0.209 3	0.140 8	0.129 3	0.359 2

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表 5 一般债券对不同类别民间投资的影响

民间投资类别	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
民间投资类别	个体	股份	集体	联营	内资	私营	有限	其他
L.个体	0.409 0^***
	(0.053 2)
L.股份		0.083 6
		(0.105 3)
L.集体
			0.416 5^***
L.联营			(0.049 1)
L.内资				0.189 3^***
				(0.047 9)
L.私营
					-2.118 1
L.有限					(1.314 3)
L.其他						0.222 9
						(0.184 7)
L.个体
							0.183 4
L.股份							(0.146 0)
								0.094 2
L.集体								(0.146 7)
ordinary	39.979 3^***	4.562 2	-1.102 6	-2.466 9	756.554 4^***	256.440 2^***	204.815 9^**	6.629 1^*
	(12.492 4)	(3.905 5)	(13.706 8)	(2.347 1)	(233.994 9)	(82.615 9)	(99.163 8)	(29.786 7)
ordinary_sq	-43.384 1^***	-4.938 6	-2.801 0	2.338 3	-656.165 9^***	-225.730 4^***	-232.089 5^**	-8.256 4^*
	(16.186 7)	(4.777 4)	(14.912 6)	(2.614 0)	(226.130 9)	(86.954 7)	(106.268 4)	(32.892 0)
控制变量	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AR(1)	0.078 1	0.080 2	0.025 2	0.084 4	0.022 1	0.113 9	0.033 2	0.067 1
AR(2)	0.425 5	0.511 8	0.180 2	0.303 0	0.625 5	0.898 3	0.198 7	0.226 3
Sargan检验	0.371 3	0.169 2	0.427 7	0.242 1	0.136 7	0.193 0	0.178 3	0.217 1

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表 6 考虑内生性问题的回归结果

变量	政府债务			专项债		一般债
变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
L.民间投资	0.663 1^***	0.674 0^***	0.675 9^***	0.003 9	0.060 2	0.030 8	0.036 3
	(0.085 2)	(0.084 7)	(0.085 2)	(0.068 6)	(0.068 6)	(0.077 3)	(0.071 2)
L.政府债务占比	-2.172 4^*	-2.569 4^*	-2.476 9^*
	(3.828 6)	(3.820 7)	(3.813 3)
L.D		-0.001 8
		(0.001 2)
L.D×政府债务占比			-0.003 4
			(0.002 4)
L.special				39.350 6^***	32.273 4
				(12.009 8)	(34.365 2)
L.special_sq					-162.304 6^**
					(75.844 2)
L.ordinary						14.544 6	31.134 8^*
						(11.576 2)	(61.251 3)
L.ordinary_sq							-61.114 3^*
							(70.200 8)
控制变量	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
AR(1)	0.002 2	0.002 6	0.002 3	0.156 1	0.221 4	0.156 7	0.221 3
AR(2)	0.362 1	0.349 3	0.364 2	0.348 5	0.445 6	0.317 5	0.584 3
Sargan检验	0.532 3	0.426 9	0.416 0	0.274 9	0.226 6	0.378 3	0.474 2

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表 7 稳健性检验Ⅰ: 剔除极端值

变量	(1)	(2)
L.民间投资	0.057 6	0.029 4
	(0.068 6)	(0.080 6)
L.special	-11.636 7^*
	(6.134 2)
L.special_sq	7.820 9^***
	(2.498 2)
L.ordinary		2.442 8^*
		(4.970 7)
L.ordinary_sq		-10.233 3^*
		(0.497 8)
控制变量	Yes	Yes
AR(1)	0.048 0	0.242 5
AR(2)	0.321 1	0.448 6
Sargan检验	0.178 2	0.164 9

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表 8 稳健性检验Ⅱ: 改变被解释变量测度方式

变量	(1)	(2)
L.民间投资	0.164 1^***	0.165 8^***
	(0.050 2)	(0.048 3)
L.special	11.662 7^*
	(9.144 3)
L.special_sq	-6.050 2^**
	(4.744 2)
L.ordinary		-0.307 7
		(4.546 1)
L.ordinary_sq		-0.064 6^*
		(0.459 2)
控制变量	Yes	Yes
AR(1)	0.044 2	0.241 3
AR(2)	0.307 8	0.335 2
Sargan检验	0.274 3	0.189 7

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