The Influence of "Two-way" Decentralization in Science and Technology on Innovation Performance
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摘要: 从分权的视角剖析1984年以来我国科技体制的特征，并在创新系统框架下研究中央政府、地方政府和市场在促进创新方面的协同作用机制，进而揭示科技“双向”分权对创新绩效的交互作用机理。理论和经验分析均表明，为充分发挥中央政府、地方政府和市场在促进创新方面的协同作用，在科技事务上，政府有必要向市场分权，同时，中央政府有必要向地方政府分权。但是，由于科技“双向”分权对创新绩效的作用是相互依赖和相互影响的，科技“双向”分权的程度并不是越高越好。因而要促进科技创新，加快创新型国家建设，应该适当强化政府尤其是中央政府在科技领域的作用。Abstract: From the perspective of decentralization, this paper analyses the characteristics of China's science and technology system since 1984 and examines the synergistic mechanism of central government, local government and market in promoting innovation under the framework of innovation system, and then reveals the interactive mechanism of "two-way" decentralization of science and technology on innovation performance. Both theoretical and empirical analysis show that in order to give full play to the synergy of central government, local government and market in promoting innovation, it is necessary for the government to decentralize power to the market in scientific and technological affairs; at the same time, it is necessary for the central government to decentralize power to the local government; however, as the "two-way" decentralization of science and technology plays an interdependent and mutually influential role in innovation performance, the degree of "two-way" decentralization in science and technology is not that the higher the better. Therefore, in order to promote scientific and technological innovation and accelerate the construction of an innovative country, the role of the government, especially the central government, should be properly strengthened in the field of science and technology.
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表 1 主要变量统计性描述
变量 变量释义 样本量 平均值 标准差 最小值 最大值 Inn 创新产出数量 341 8.310 2 1.598 0 2.302 6 12.068 7 Quality1 创新质量 341 0.232 5 0.0933 0.055 9 0.652 6 Quality2 创新质量 341 0.243 8 0.095 7 0.067 1 0.652 6 Quality3 创新质量 341 6.822 7 1.616 8 0.693 1 10.381 2 Gd 科技领域央地分权程度 341 0.825 4 1.119 7 0.152 1 7.808 7 Mar 科技领域政府向市场分权程度 341 3.558 2 2.288 2 0.039 0 11.124 3 K 研发资本性投入 341 12.446 2 1.566 4 7.694 0 15.303 0 L 研发劳动投入 341 9.932 7 1.341 0 5.318 1 12.382 9 For 对外开放程度 341 0.311 9 0.405 2 0.032 1 1.722 2 Humcap 人力资本水平 341 7.719 0 1.241 2 2.057 2 11.084 5 Ind 产业结构 341 0.403 2 0.069 4 0.286 3 0.735 0 Infr 基础设施水平 341 0.054 0 0.019 5 0.018 0 0.106 8 
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表 2 估计结果
被解释变量：专利申请受理数量 固定效应 一步差分法 两步差分法 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Inn(-1) 0.571 2*** 0.563 2*** 0.501 7*** 0.509 0*** (11.147 8) (11.213 0) (12.557 5) (7.510 5) Gd 0.078 8 0.040 3 0.051 0** 0.096 4*** 0.121 1*** 0.113 3*** (1.381 3) (0.576 9) (1.994 6) (2.651 5) (4.151 1) (3.637 8) Mar 0.047 1 0.032 8 0.000 2 0.015 2 -0.005 3 0.019 9*** (1.490 5) (0.865 2) (0.010 8) (0.758 2) (-1.109 4) (2.621 7) Gd*Mar 0.015 7 -0.015 8* -0.018 0** (0.722 1) (-1.516 7) (-2.406 2) 控制变量 已控制 已控制 已控制 已控制 已控制 已控制 N 341 341 279 279 279 279 AR(1) -3.207 3 -3.193 5 -2.271 7 -2.295 1 检验值[P]a [0.001 3] [0.001 4] [0.023 1] [0.021 7] AR(2) -0.674 5 -0.611 5 -0.478 2 -0.499 6 检验值[P]b [0.500 0] [0.540 9] [0.632 5] [0.617 4] Sargan 173.497 181.423 6 21.119 1 24.813 0 检验值[P]c [0.000 0] [0.000 0] [1.000 0] [1.000 0] 注：*、**、***分别表示p < 0.10、p < 0.05、p < 0.01。下表同
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表 3 科技“双向”分权与创新质量
被解释变量：创新质量 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Quality1(-1) 0.324 6*** 0.386 9*** (7.777 0) (5.009 2) Quality2(-1) 0.166 4*** 0.185 5*** (4.078 6) (2.934 4) Quality3(-1) 0.477 7*** 0.472 5*** (14.837 8) (11.632 1) Gd 0.015 0* 0.022 8*** 0.005 3 0.033 0*** 0.058 0 0.097 6*** (1.842 6) (5.290 8) (1.484 2) (5.778 8) (1.638 0) (3.136 2) Mar 0.005 5*** 0.012 5*** 0.001 2 0.008 5*** -0.017 5 0.014 2 (5.386 4) (5.495 3) (0.760 2) (4.232 0) (-1.512 9) (1.043 0) Gd*Mar -0.007 5*** -0.009 6*** -0.027 7*** (-5.834 4) (-8.171 3) (-3.756 8) 控制变量 已控制 已控制 已控制 已控制 已控制 已控制 N 279 279 279 279 279 279 AR(1) -2.128 5 -2.136 2 -1.647 2 -1.639 7 -2.785 6 -2.881 6 检验值[P]a [0.033 3] [0.032 7] [0.099 5] [0.101 1] [0.005 3] [0.004 0] AR(2) 0.670 1 0.111 3 -0.599 6 0.050 1 1.757 4 1.970 4 检验值[P]b [0.502 8] [0.911 4] [0.548 8] [0.960 0] [0.078 8] [0.048 8] Sargan 19.665 6 23.194 2 21.541 9 18.314 6 27.487 6 28.159 0 检验值[P]c [1.000 0] [1.000 0] [1.000 0] [1.000 0] [1.000 0] [1.000 0] 注：控制变量与表 2中一致
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