Accounting Conservatism and Corporate R & D Investment: Evidence from Chinese Capital Market
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摘要: 使用2007—2017年沪深A股上市公司的数据, 研究会计稳健性对企业研发投入的影响, 并进一步考察所有权性质对二者关系的影响以及异质性机构投资者和信息透明度这两种机制在其中发挥的治理作用。研究结果表明, 会计稳健性程度越高, 企业的研发投入越少, 说明会计稳健性会抑制企业的研发投入。基于所有权性质的进一步检验发现, 在非国有企业中会计稳健性对研发投入的抑制作用更强, 而稳定型机构投资者和企业信息透明度的提高能够缓解会计稳健性对研发投入的负面影响。本研究对于全面认识会计稳健性在企业投资活动中的影响及降低会计稳健性对研发投资的负面作用, 均具有重要的理论和现实意义。Abstract: Using the data of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017, this paper investigates the impact of accounting conservatism on R & D investment, and further tests the role played by ownership, heterogeneous institutional investors and information transparency. The results show that the higher the accounting conservatism is, the less the R & D investment of enterprises is, indicating that accounting conservatism will restrain the R & D investment of enterprises. It is found through further tests based on the nature of ownership that accounting conservatism has a stronger inhibitory effect on R & D investment in non-state-owned enterprises than that in state-owned enterprises; while stable institutional investors and the improvement of enterprise information transparency can alleviate the negative impact of accounting conservatism on R & D investment. This study is of theoretically and practically significance for comprehensive understanding of the impact of accounting conservatism on enterprise investment activities and how to reduce the negative effect of accounting conservatism on R & D investment.
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表 1 变量定义及度量
变量符号 变量名称 变量定义 RD 研发投入 企业研发支出与总资产的比值 C_Score 会计稳健性 借鉴Khan和Watts[35]计算的会计稳健性指标 Stable 机构投资者类型 若为稳定型机构投资者，取值为1，否则为0 Opaque 信息透明度 根据修正的横截面Jones模型计算出可操控性应计利润，采用前三期可操控应计利润的绝对值加总来度量公司的信息透明度，该值越大表示公司的信息透明度越低 Top 高管持股比例 高管持有股份占总股本的比例 N 所有权性质 企业属于国有上市公司取值为1，否则取值为0 Age 企业年龄 企业上市年限的自然对数 Lev 资产负债率 总负债/总资产 CFO 现金流 经营活动现金流量净额/总资产 Size 企业规模 总资产的自然对数 Year 年度虚拟变量 指定年份取值为1，其他年份取值为0 
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表 2 主要变量的描述性统计
变量名 观测值 均值 中位数 标准差 最大值 最小值 RD 9 880 0.018 0.014 0.017 0.087 0.0001 C_Score 9 880 0.016 0.016 0.063 0.329 -0.331 Top 9 880 0.060 0 0.117 0.466 0 N 9 880 0.463 0 0.499 1 0 Age 9 880 2.248 2.303 0.538 3.178 1.386 Lev 9 880 0.453 0.452 0.194 0.867 0.069 CFO 9 880 0.046 0.043 0.066 0.238 -0.138 Size 9 880 22.330 22.155 1.208 26.094 20.070 Opaque 9 880 0.173 0.139 0.152 3.178 0.004 Stable 9 880 0.506 1 0.500 1 0
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表 3 主要变量相关性分析
Variables RD C_Score Opaque Top N CFO Age Stable Lev Size RD 1 0.097*** -0.044*** 0.311*** -0.228*** 0.080*** -0.226*** 0.012 -0.289*** -0.251*** C_Score 0.065*** 1 0.071*** 0.087*** -0.107*** -0.167*** -0.094*** -0.075*** 0.220*** -0.583*** Opaque -0.054*** 0.028*** 1 0.031*** -0.048*** -0.084*** -0.031*** -0.011 0.064*** -0.017* Stable 0.021** -0.078*** -0.017* -0.069*** 0.058*** 0.046*** 0.055*** 1 -0.002 0.061*** Top 0.193*** 0.086*** 0.010 1 -0.538*** -0.018* -0.517*** -0.125*** -0.298*** -0.243*** N -0.180*** -0.121*** -0.050*** -0.457*** 1 -0.020** 0.442*** 0.058*** 0.294*** 0.268*** CFO 0.091*** -0.171*** -0.096*** -0.026*** -0.020** 1 -0.021** 0.048*** -0.154*** 0.016 Age -0.180*** -0.094*** -0.007 -0.515*** 0.447*** -0.014 1 0.053*** 0.280*** 0.356*** Lev -0.242*** 0.208*** 0.083*** -0.282*** 0.296*** -0.166*** 0.287*** -0.003 1 0.485*** Size -0.201*** -0.632*** 0.018* -0.252*** 0.287*** 0.020** 0.331*** 0.073*** 0.484*** 1 注：上下半角分别为Spearman和Pearson相关系数，*、**、***分别表示10%、5%、1% 的显著性水平。下表同。
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表 4 会计稳健性对公司研发投入的影响
Variables (1) (2) (3) C_Score 0.012 8***(3.443 5) -0.010 3**(-1.932 8) L.C_Score -0.011 2***(-2.669 5) Top 0.007 9**(2.207 0) 0.001 2(0.289 1) N -0.000 7(-0.584 7) -0.001 5(-1.280 3) CFO 0.010 8***(4.791 6) 0.011 4***(4.739 5) Age -0.001 6(-1.232 0) -0.005 0***(-2.760 1) Lev 0.001 5(0.762 4) 0.000 1(0.054 5) Size -0.005 1***(-10.588 9) -0.005 1***(-11.578 5) Constant 0.010 7***(12.829 6) 0.121 8***(12.074 6) 0.127 0***(13.093 9) Year 控制 控制 控制 N 9 880 9 880 7 616 F统计量 13.76 12.96 13.86 (P值) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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表 5 所有权性质、会计稳健性与公司研发投入
Variables (1)
国有企业(2)
非国有企业C_Score 0.000 3(0.046 9) -0.026 5***(-2.746 2) Top -0.049 8*(-1.825 6) 0.009 0**(2.168 8) CFO 0.007 7***(2.908 2) 0.014 4***(3.999 6) Age -0.002 7(-1.582 6) -0.001 0(-0.460 5) Lev -0.003 0(-1.318 1) 0.007 5**(2.364 9) Size -0.002 6***(-4.485 7) -0.006 9***(-8.856 8) Constant 0.071 9***(5.659 1) 0.160 5***(9.768 8) Year 控制 控制 N 4 574 5 306 F统计量 18.64 9.67 (P值) (0.000) (0.000)
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表 6 稳定型机构投资者和信息透明度对会计稳健性与公司研发投入的影响
Variables (1)
机构投资者类型(2)
信息透明度C_Score -0.015 3***(-2.676 0) -0.013 6**(-2.421 7) Stable -0.000 1(-0.430 1) C_Score*Stable 0.009 5**(2.417 2) Infor 0.000 4(1.288 6) C_Score*Infor 0.008 0*(1.830 7) Top 0.007 8**(2.200 3) 0.007 8**(2.194 0) N -0.000 7(-0.588 0) -0.000 7(-0.578 2) CFO 0.010 7***(4.752 9) 0.010 8***(4.7740) Age -0.001 6(-1.231 9) -0.001 7(-1.293 7) Lev 0.001 5(0.767 8) 0.001 4(0.729 6) Size -0.005 1***(-10.607 1) -0.005 0***(-10.490 2) Constant 0.122 0***(12.099 1) 0.120 8***(11.963 4) Year 控制 控制 N 9 880 9 880 F统计量 12.95 12.98 (P值) (0.000) (0.000)
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表 7 稳健性检验
Variables (1)
RD(2)
RD(3)
RDC_Score -0.029 1**(-2.381 5) -0.009 3*(-1.656 3) L.C_Score -0.036 8***(-4.217 9) Top -0.000 6(-0.074 2) -0.003 6(-0.405 2) 0.010 4**(2.524 7) N 0.002 6(1.005 1) 0.002 8(1.120 1) -0.000 7(-0.559 6) CFO -0.020 5***(-3.976 1) -0.010 9**(-2.168 7) 0.011 2***(4.672 0) Age -0.006 8**(-2.325 6) -0.013 4***(-3.589 5) -0.001 2(-0.874 7) Lev -0.007 5*(-1.690 8) -0.009 1***(-2.596 4) 0.001 3(0.626 5) Size -0.005 3***(-4.820 6) -0.004 6***(-4.994 1) -0.004 9***(-9.668 2) Constant 0.151 5***(6.562 7) 0.143 4***(7.097 6) 0.117 9***(10.901 2) Year 控制 控制 控制 N 9 880 7 616 8 813 F统计量 13.57 16.05 13.26 (P值) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
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