Technological Progress Trigger Trade Friction with China:Based on Industrial Level
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摘要: 日益增多的对华贸易摩擦是我国深度融入全球经济的必然现象。某一行业或产品的技术进步可能给一国的出口贸易带来比较优势, 但也可能引发国与国之间的贸易摩擦。基于1996年~2014年间中国遭受12个重要贸易伙伴国的贸易救济案件数据, 从行业层面实证检验我国行业技术进步招致贸易摩擦可能性的影响效应。结果表明:行业技术进步越快, 该行业遭遇他国贸易救济行为的可能性越大; 技术进步对贸易救济的影响效应具有行业异质性和国别异质性, 技术密集型行业、后发新兴行业的技术进步对贸易救济的影响更为显著, 进口额大且进口渗透率高的行业更容易出现实质性的贸易救济措施裁决, 发达国家对我国的技术进步更为敏感。为应对频繁的贸易摩擦, 我国应善于使用WTO贸易争端解决机制, 避开容易引发贸易救济的相关政策, 加大自主创新力度, 提升出口产品的性价比优势, 积极开拓更多新兴贸易市场。Abstract: Increasing trade friction with China is an inevitable phenomenon while China has been integrated deeply into global economy. Technological progress in a certain industry or product may bring comparative advantages to a country's export, but it will also lead to trade frictions between countries. Based on data of trade remedies towards China from 12 important trade partners from 1996 to 2014, this paper empirically examines the impact of trade frictions caused by technological progress in China's industries at industrial level.The results show that the higher the technological progress of the industry is, the greater the possibility that the industry will encounter trade remedies from other countries; the effects of technological progress on trade remedies are characterized by industry heterogeneity and country heterogeneity; the effects of technological progress on trade remedies are more significant in technology-intensive industries and emerging industries; industries with large imports and high import penetration are more likely to suffer real implementation of trade remedies; and developed countries are more sensitive to China's technological progress. In order to cope with frequent trade frictions, China should take advantage of WTO trade dispute mechanism, avoid using policies that easily lead to trade remedies, strengthen self-dependent innovation, enhance the cost-effective advantage of export products, and proactively explore more emerging trade markets.
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Key words:
- technical progress /
- international trade /
- Sino-US trade /
- trade friction /
- trade remedy /
- trade welfare
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表 1 因变量和自变量的描述统计
变量 均值 标准差 最小值 最大值 观测值 TRjkt 0.096 0.294 0 1 6 050 TRCNjkt 0.160 0.695 0 22 6 050 TRINjkt 0.059 0.339 0 9 6 050 producratiojkt 0.651 1.180 0.004 20.723 6 050 imppenejkt 0.142 0.149 5.36e-06 0.769 6 050 lnimpjkt 13.385 2.239 2.063 18.981 6 050 outputgrowjkt 0.125 0.921 -0.930 22.949 6 050 TRjkt-1 0.091 0.288 0 1 6 050 realexjt 3.471 4.976 0.000 3 54.378 6 050 gdpgrowjt 3.407 3.266 -13.127 11.308 6 050 clubjt 0.590 0.492 0 1 6 050 FTAjt 0.167 0.372 0 1 6 050 WTOjt 0.668 0.471 0 1 6 050 
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表 2 技术进步对贸易救济的影响效应：基准回归
TRjkt TRCNjkt TRINjkt logit logit NB2 NB2 NB2 NB2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) producratiojkt 0.114*** 0.276*** 0.108*** 0.199*** 0.106** 0.272*** (0.036) (0.097) (0.026) (0.070) (0.044) (0.096) producratio_sqjkt -0.013 -0.006 -0.012** (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) imppenejkt -0.965* -0.920 -0.706 -0.676 -0.178 -0.101 (0.579) (0.578) (0.507) (0.505) (0.811) (0.812) lnimpjkt 0.220*** 0.236*** 0.238*** 0.245*** 0.187*** 0.194*** (0.038) (0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.070) (0.065) outputgrowjkt 0.016 0.017 0.026 0.027 0.140*** 0.142*** (0.065) (0.067) (0.045) (0.045) (0.037) (0.037) TRjkt-1 0.903*** 0.890*** 0.818*** 0.810*** 0.699*** 0.689*** (0.120) (0.121) (0.099) (0.099) (0.144) (0.144) realexjt -0.028* -0.021 -0.040** -0.035* -0.015 -0.002 (0.016) (0.015) (0.019) (0.0176) (0.046) (0.041) gdpgrowjt 0.056** 0.050* 0.030 0.027 0.005 -0.0004 (0.026) (0.026) (0.023) (0.023) (0.036) (0.036) clubjt 1.239*** 1.181*** 1.407*** 1.365*** 1.582*** 1.510*** (0.155) (0.153) (0.143) (0.143) (0.252) (0.240) FTAjt 0.131 0.0266 0.134 0.066 0.009 -0.110 (0.182) (0.188) (0.159) (0.164) (0.261) (0.260) WTOjt -0.264 -0.139 -0.392 -0.315 2.928*** 2.876*** (0.329) (0.330) (0.306) (0.306) (1.058) (1.072) _cons -4.282*** -4.481*** -4.585*** -4.677*** -7.261*** -7.379*** (0.582) (0.589) (0.547) (0.543) (1.280) (1.251) 时间固定效应 是 是 是 是 是 是 行业固定效应 是 是 是 是 是 是 Log pseudolikelihood -1 451.01 -1 448.69 -2 030.10 -2 029.10 -947.75 -946.49 Wald chi2 P值 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 观测值 5 823 5 823 6 050 6 050 6 050 6 050 说明：括号中为稳健标准误，***、**、*分别表示在1%、5%、10%水平下显著。表 3及表 4同。
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表 3 技术进步对贸易救济的影响效应：滞后一期检验
TRjkt TRCNjkt TRINjkt logit logit NB2 NB2 NB2 NB2 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) producratiojkt-1 0.143*** 0.304*** 0.122*** 0.211*** 0.137*** 0.314*** (0.038 2) (0.107) (0.030) (0.082) (0.051) (0.118) producratio_sqjkt-1 -0.015 -0.007 -0.016* (0.010) (0.007) (0.009) imppenejkt-1 -0.624 -1.003* -0.903* -0.884* -0.449 -0.383 (0.403) (0.607) (0.538) (0.537) (0.808) (0.812) lnimpjkt-1 0.144*** 0.210*** 0.229*** 0.235*** 0.156** 0.160** (0.031) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040) (0.074) (0.070) outputgrowjkt-1 0.008 0.015 -0.033 -0.031 -0.654 -0.673 (0.040) (0.045) (0.039) (0.039) (0.435) (0.438) TRjkt-1 1.782*** 0.881*** 0.789*** 0.782*** 0.688*** 0.678*** (0.110) (0.123) (0.099) (0.099) (0.143) (0.143) realexjt 0.0007 0.0006 -0.028 -0.022 0.0004 0.014 (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.052) (0.049) gdpgrowjt-1 0.059** 0.069*** 0.053** 0.051** 0.017 0.0123 (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.036) (0.036) clubjt 0.860*** 1.056*** 1.322*** 1.279*** 1.545*** 1.467*** (0.158) (0.171) (0.155) (0.159) (0.263) (0.259) FTAjt 0.044 0.035 0.111 0.055 0.044 -0.061 (0.172) (0.191) (0.158) (0.164) (0.270) (0.269) WTOjt 0.05 -0.037 -0.316 -0.241 2.289*** 2.253*** (0.322) (0.340) (0.314) (0.316) (0.664) (0.672) _cons -5.437*** -4.335*** -4.686*** -4.758*** -6.126*** -6.214*** (0.464) (0.602) (0.566) (0.564) (1.244) (1.188) 时间固定效应 是 是 是 是 是 是 行业固定效应 是 是 是 是 是 是 Log pseudolikelihood -1 585.00 -1 385.02 -1 941.85 -1 941.18 -938.92 -937.91 Wald chi2 P值 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 观测值 5 504 5 504 5 719 5 719 5 719 5 719
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表 4 技术进步对贸易救济的影响效应：异质性检验
TRCNjkt(NB2) TRINjkt (NB2) 技术密集
行业技术进步
率 < 1发展中
国家发达
国家技术密集
行业技术进步
率 < 1发展中
国家发达
国家(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) producratiojkt 1.879*** 1.758* 0.104** -2.752 2.210*** 4.398*** 0.231* 2.380** (0.344) (1.053) (0.035) (1.913) (0.514) (1.552) (0.139) (1.094) producratio_sqjkt -0.423*** -0.936 -0.002 3.886** -0.445*** -3.638** -0.007 -0.121 (0.113) (1.001) (0.004) (1.762) (0.158) (1.529) (0.007) (2.532) imppenejkt 1.526* -1.124* -0.014 1.001 1.928 -0.465 0.646 5.231*** (0.894) (0.582) (0.785) (0.866) (1.721) (0.893) (1.261) (1.550) lnimpjkt 0.358*** 0.291*** 0.633*** 0.405*** 0.320*** 0.251*** 0.641*** 0.571*** (0.063) (0.047) (0.100) (0.092) (0.115) (0.080) (0.185) (0.134) outputgrowjkt -0.340 0.047 0.041 0.022 -0.515 0.131*** 0.163*** -0.197 (0.281) (0.039) (0.040) (0.091) (1.397) (0.037) (0.055) (0.651) TRjkt-1 0.544*** 0.810*** 0.451*** 0.778*** 0.388 0.657*** 0.322* 0.276 (0.159) (0.115) (0.124) (0.153) (0.273) (0.167) (0.190) (0.210) realexjt 0.0003 -0.023 -0.034* 0.045 0.052 0.0155 0.039 0.031 (0.017) (0.014) (0.021) (0.074) (0.084) (0.034) (0.065) (0.106) gdpgrowjt 0.038 0.029 0.011 0.087 0.019 -0.020 -0.004 -0.138 (0.034) (0.028) (0.023) (0.067) (0.057) (0.045) (0.036) (0.113) clubjt 1.271*** 1.338*** 1.141*** 2.182*** 1.224** 1.347*** 1.827*** 3.867*** (0.222) (0.169) (0.146) (0.657) (0.480) (0.291) (0.577) (1.018) FTAjt -0.366 -0.090 -0.093 1.035** -0.673 -0.342 1.391 1.465 (0.285) (0.241) (0.181) (0.484) (0.444) (0.385) (0.971) (1.073) WTOjt 0.136 1.671* 0.259 -0.651 1.461 2.205* 5.512** 0.010 (0.518) (0.977) (0.305) (0.621) (1.033) (1.244) (2.531) (1.282) _cons -7.199*** -5.367*** -8.486*** -8.262*** -24.39*** -8.137*** -27.30*** -14.39*** (0.923) (0.757) (1.214) (1.357) (2.629) (1.508) (2.957) (2.279) 时间固定效应 是 是 是 是 是 是 是 是 行业固定效应 是 是 是 是 是 是 是 是 准对数似然比 -712.34 -1527.35 -986.96 -940.66 -285.58 -722.31 -451.32 -397.98 Wald chi2 P值 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 观测值 2264 4993 2978 3072 2264 4993 2978 3072
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