Tax Compliance and Corporate Performance Under the Difference of Corporate Governance Mechanism
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摘要: 实现税收遵从与企业绩效的协同提升是现代公司治理的重大目标。从董事会、股东和高管三个层面考察公司治理机制差异下税收遵从与企业绩效间的关系，研究发现税收遵从与企业绩效之间是协同提升还是发生冲突主要取决于不同的公司治理机制。在董事会层面，独立董事比例的提高有利于促进企业尤其是纳税信用等级较低的企业实现税收遵从与企业绩效的协同提升，但董事长与总经理两职合一对税收遵从与企业绩效的关系变化总体上没有明显影响；在股东层面，随着股权集中度的上升，税收遵从与企业绩效之间面临的冲突风险增加但不显著；在高管层面，高管持股比例越高，企业尤其是纳税信用等级较低的企业更有可能通过降低税收遵从度来提升绩效。从实证结果看，要实现税收遵从与企业绩效的协同提升，保障政企双赢，需要优化公司治理机制，特别是要提升独立董事比例，加大对高管持股比例高的企业的税收监管力度。Abstract: It is the major goal of modern corporate governance to realize the synergistic improvement of both tax compliance and corporate performance. This paper examines the relationship between tax compliance and corporate performance under the differences of corporate governance mechanisms from three levels i.e. the board of directors, shareholders and senior executives. It is found that whether the relationship between tax compliance and corporate performance is synergistic or confrontational depends on different corporate governance mechanisms. First, at the level of the board of directors, the increase of the proportion of independent directors is conducive to promoting enterprises, especially those with originally low tax payment credit rating, to realize the coordinated improvement of tax compliance and corporate performance; however, the integration of the chair of the board and the general manager has no obvious impact on the change of their relationship. Second, at the level of the shareholder, with the increase of equity concentration, the risk of conflict between tax compliance and enterprise performance increases, but not significantly. Third, at the level of the executive, the higher the shareholding ratio of senior executives, the more likely enterprises, especially those with low tax payment credit rating, are to improve their performance by reducing tax compliance. Based on the empirical results, in order to achieve the coordinated improvement of both tax compliance and enterprise performance, and to ensure the win-win situation between the government and enterprises, it is necessary to optimize the corporate governance mechanism, especially to increase the proportion of independent directors, and strengthen tax supervision over enterprises with high proportions of executive shareholding.
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表 1 变量定义
类型 名称 指标 符号 含义 被解释变量 税前企业绩效 营业利润率 EF 营业利润占企业全部业务收入的比例 解释变量 税收遵从 税收遵从度 TC 根据税务部门每年对企业评定的纳税信用等级数据折算的百分率 二元哑变量 TCB 纳税信用等级大于等于B为1，否为0 二元哑变量 TCC 纳税信用等级大于等于C为1，否为0 董事会层面 独立董事比例 BI 独立董事人数占董事会人数的比例 两职合一情况 LH 董事长与总经理两职合一为1，否为0 股东层面 股权集中度 GJ 第一大股东持股数占总股本的比例 高管层面 高管持股比例 GG 管理层持股数占总股本的比例 高管平均年薪 lnMC 领取薪酬企业高管平均年薪水平的自然对数 其他公司治理变量 股权性质 GX 国有控股公司为1，否为0 董事会规模 DG 董事会人数 企业规模 lnSZ 企业期末总资产的自然对数 年龄 lnAG 企业数据样本采集年份与成立年份之差的自然对数 控制变量 财务杠杆 LE 企业期末总负债占总资产的比例 无形资产比例 IA 企业期末无形资产占总资产的比例 现金流量比例 ML 企业期末现金资产占总资产的比例 
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表 2 变量的描述性统计
变量 N 均值 标准差 最小值 最大值 EF 1 745 0.1 0.43 -14.45 0.68 TC 1 745 0.8 0.13 0.3 0.9 BI 1 745 0.38 0.13 0.3 0.67 LH 1 745 0.38 0.49 0 1 GG 1 745 0.23 0.25 0 1 lnMC 1 745 12.58 0.66 3.22 18.37 GJ 1 745 0.34 0.15 0.03 0.84 GX 1 745 0.13 0.34 0 1 DG(人) 1 745 8.47 1.51 3 15 lnSZ 1 745 12.52 1.31 9.23 17.63 lnAG 1 745 2.79 0.37 1.1 4.09 LE 1 745 0.4 0.21 0.3 2.39 IA 1 745 0.04 0.05 0 0.61 ML 1 745 0.15 0.12 0.000 02 0.98
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表 3 税收遵从与公司治理变量的交互项对企业绩效的影响
变量 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) C 3.41 0.69 0.27 0.46 -0.63 2.53 (1.52) (0.32) (0.12) (0.21) (-0.3) (1.06) EF(-1) -2.6*** -2.55*** -2.56*** -2.55*** -2.55*** -2.62*** (-20.51) (-20.02) (-20.04) (-20.02) (-20.01) (-20.53) EF(-2) -2.05*** -2.03*** -2.03*** -2.03*** -2.03*** -2.05*** (-16.91) (-16.59) (-16.62) (-16.58) (-16.59) (-16.89) TC -3.09*** 0.15 0.43 0.27 -0.14 -2.47 (-3.76) (0.93) (1.28) (1.39) (-0.11) (-1.46) TC×BI 8.59*** — — — — 9.17*** (3.95) (4.16) TC×LH — -0.12 — — — 0.07 (-0.44) (0.24) TC×GJ — — -0.99 — — -1.39 (-1.03) (-1.42) TC×GG — — — -0.63 — -0.78 (-1.12) (-1.3) TC×MC — — — — 0.02 -0.02 (0.19) (-0.17) R2 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 F 4.1*** 3.96*** 3.97*** 3.97*** 3.96*** 4.06*** D.W 2.36 2.34 2.33 2.33 2.34 2.36 N 1 047 1 047 1 047 1 047 1 047 1 047 注：括号中为t统计量，* * *、* *和*分别代表在1%、5%和10%水平上具有统计显著性。下表同。
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表 4 稳健性检验
Panel A 纳税信用等级为B及以上的企业 变量 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) TCB -2.78*** 0.22** 0.27 0.33*** 0.17 -3.1*** (-5.32) (2.37) (1.47) (3.13) (0.23) (-2.98) TCB×BI 8.14*** — — — — 9.23*** (5.77) (6.32) TCB×LH — -0.06 — — — 0.27 (-0.38) (1.5) TCB×GJ — — -0.22 — — -0.42 (-0.41) (-0.78) TCB×GG — — — -0.59* — -1.04*** (-1.82) (-2.85) TCB×MC — — — — 0.002 0.02 (0.04) (0.25) R2 0.70 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.70 F 4.3*** 4.01*** 4.01*** 4.04*** 4.01*** 4.32*** D.W 2.35 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.34 2.36 N 1 047 1 047 1 047 1 047 1 047 1 047 Panel B 纳税信用等级为C及以上的企业 变量 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) TCC -3.89*** 0.6*** -0.33 0.73*** -0.5 -6.16*** (-5.51) (3.01) (-0.69) (2.65) (-0.61) (-2.78) TCC×BI 11.56*** — — — — 10.98*** (6.08) (4.69) TCC×LH — -1.09*** — — — -0.32 (-3.57) (-0.79) TCC×GJ — — 2.31 — — 4.55 (1.34) (1.50) TCC×GG — — — -1.78** — -2.03 (-2.21) (-1.64) TCC×MC — — — — 0.06 0.16 (0.96) (1.17) R2 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.70 F 4.29*** 4.08*** 3.99*** 4.02*** 3.98*** 4.35*** D.W 2.35 2.38 2.33 2.33 2.33 2.35 N 1 047 1 047 1 047 1 047 1 047 1 047
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