Can Private Enterprises Obtain More Government Subsidies by Reducing Reasonable Tax Avoidance: An Interpretation of Corporate Tax Payment Motivation
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摘要: 我国正处于经济转型的关键时期，由于所有权性质的局限性，相较于国有企业，民营企业更有动机进行寻租，以获取更多的经济资源。以2008—2018年A股上市民营企业为研究对象，探讨民营企业减少合理避税对其未来获得政府补助的影响，研究发现：在地方经济表现下滑以及政府面临的财政压力日益增大的背景下，民营企业会将减少合理避税作为一种寻租手段，以便能够在未来获得更多的政府补助，且民营企业参与混合所有制改革有助于抑制上述现象。本文揭示了在面临市场准入限制等困境下，民营企业仍选择减少合理避税背后的逻辑，有助于人们认识民营企业的纳税动机及经济后果，并为推动企业混合所有制改革提供理论和经验支持。Abstract: China is currently in a critical period of economic transformation. Due to the limitation of ownership, compared with state-owned enterprises, private-owned enterprises are more motivated to undertake rent-seeking activities to obtain more resources. Using a dataset of listed private-owned enterprises in China, this study investigates the relationship between their corporate tax avoidance and subsequent acquisition of government subsidies. The findings indicate that in the context of decreasing provincial economic performance, private-owned enterprises will treat paying more corporate tax as a means of rent-seeking, to help them obtain more government subsidies in the future. Further research shows that mixed ownership reform in private-owned enterprises can curb rent-seeking and promote healthy development of privately owned enterprises. This study reveals the reason that private-owned enterprises in China still choose to pay comparatively high corporate tax even if under the background of economic downturn. Furthermore, as to the promotion of high-quality development of privately owned enterprises, it helps readers better understand the importance of mixed ownership reform and provides evidence for promoting the mixed ownership reform in China.
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表 1 主要变量及定义
变量类型 变量名称 变量符号 变量定义 被解释变量 未来获取的政府补助 Subsidyt+1 第t+1年企业获得的政府补助金额/第t年利润总额 解释变量 合理避税程度 Rate 名义所得税率-实际所得税率，其中实际所得税率=当期所得税费用/利润总额 工具变量 地方经济表现 EP 各省剔除时间趋势的实际GDP 控制变量 企业规模 Size 企业年末资产总额的自然对数 营业收入成长性 Growth (第t年营业收入-第t-1年营业收入)/第t-1年营业收入 财务杠杆 Lev 年末负债总额/资产总额 高管持股比例 Magratio 高管持股总数/企业期末总股数 董事会会议次数 Btimes 当年企业召开的董事会次数 上市年数 Ipo_year 企业上市年数 高新企业 Gaoxin 高新技术企业取值为1，否则为0 年份 YEAR 年度虚拟变量 行业 IND 行业虚拟变量 
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表 2 2008—2018年观测样本统计情况
个、% 类型 合理避税情况 地方经济表现 企业资质 合理避税程度为正 合理避税程度为负 地方经济表现差 地方经济表现好 高新技术企业 非高新技术企业 样本数 1 750 1 449 1 726 1 473 2 020 1 179 比例 54.70 45.30 53.95 46.05 63.14 36.86 类型 股票市场 行业 主板沪市 主板深市 中小板 制造业 批发和零售业 信息传输、软件和信息技术服务业 其他行业 样本数 1 380 746 1 073 2 167 206 183 643 比例 43.14 23.32 33.54 67.74 6.44 5.72 20.10 注: 观测样本数N为3 199个。
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表 3 变量的描述性统计
变量 均值 最小值 最大值 中位数 Subsidyt+1 0.222 0.001 2.821 0.083 Rate -0.001 -0.434 0.245 0.006 EP 0.000 -3.121 0.824 0.219 Size 21.975 19.689 24.903 21.934 Growth 0.226 -0.426 4.095 0.127 Lev 0.456 0.060 0.860 0.458 Magratio 0.039 0.000 0.409 0.000 Btimes 9.877 4.000 24.000 9.000 Ipo_year 11.706 1.000 26.000 12.000 Gaoxin 0.631 0.000 1.000 1.000
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表 4 相关性分析
变量 Subsidyt+1 Rate Size Growth Lev Magratio Btimes Ipo_year Gaoxin Subsidyt+1 1.000 Rate -0.151*** 1.000 Size -0.166*** -0.035* 1.000 Growth -0.091*** 0.045** 0.103*** 1.000 Lev 0.089*** -0.172*** 0.402*** 0.075*** 1.000 Magratio 0.027 -0.017 -0.166*** 0.001 -0.139*** 1.000 Btimes -0.051*** 0.019 0.343*** 0.102*** 0.227*** -0.020 1.000 Ipo_year -0.035* 0.012 0.442*** 0.021 0.170*** -0.383*** 0.199*** 1.000 Gaoxin 0.074*** -0.053** -0.165*** -0.026 -0.209*** 0.257*** -0.066*** -0.437*** 1.000 注：采用Pearson相关系数进行分析，***、**、*分别代表在1%、5%、10%水平上显著。
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表 5 企业避税与政府补助的OLS回归结果
变量 (1) (2) (3) Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Subsidyt+1 Rate -0.559*** (-8.65) -0.445*** (-6.97) -0.480*** (-7.55) Size -0.099*** (-12.45) -0.100*** (-11.91) Growth -0.055*** (-4.19) -0.052*** (-3.91) Lev 0.418*** (9.64) 0.513*** (11.26) Magratio 0.103 (1.19) 0.079 (0.86) Btimes -0.001 (-0.41) 0.001 (0.46) Ipo_year 0.008*** (4.89) 0.006*** (2.89) Gaoxin 0.087*** (5.27) 0.038** (2.07) YEAR NO NO 是 IND NO NO 是 Cons 0.221*** (30.42) 2.064*** (13.05) 2.274*** (13.03) Adj R2 0.023 0.087 0.115 注：括号内为t值，***、**、*分别代表在1%、5%、10%水平上显著。下表同。
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表 6 地方经济表现、企业避税与政府补助的2SLS回归结果(N=3 199)
变量 First Stage Rate Second Stage Subsidyt+1 Rate -6.609***(-3.16) EP 0.010*** (3.38) Size 0.004* (1.66) -0.074*** (-3.92) Growth 0.011*** (2.90) 0.012 (0.34) Lev -0.120*** (-9.57) -0.211 (-0.80) Magratio -0.013 (-0.53) 0.007 (0.04) Btimes 0.002*** (3.00) 0.010** (2.03) Ipo_year 0.001 (1.23) 0.008* (1.91) Gaoxin -0.020*** (-3.89) -0.075 (-1.40) YEAR 是 是 IND 是 是 Cons 0.023 (0.48) 2.355*** (6.81) Under identification tests： Kleibergen-Paap LM 10.146*** Weak identification tests： Kleibergen-Paap F 10.249 Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values： 15% maximal IV size 8.960 Subsidyt+1 Chi-Sq.statistics 33.510 Chi-Sq.d.f 1.000 Prob 0.000 结论 Ⅳ-2SLS模型优于OLS模型 注：R2在工具变量回归中不具有统计意义，未予汇报，下同。
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表 7 民营企业动机的异质性检验
变量 OLS Ⅳ-2SLS (1) (2) (3) Excess_return First Stage Rate Second Stage Excess_return Rate 0.353*** (5.44) 1.200 (1.08) EP 0.010*** (3.38) Size -0.043*** (-5.00) 0.004* (1.66) -0.047*** (-4.67) Growth 0.095***(7.03) 0.011*** (2.90) 0.086*** (4.82) Lev 0.155*** (3.32) -0.120*** (-9.57) 0.255* (1.83) Magratio -0.123 (-1.31) -0.013 (-0.53) -0.113 (-1.17) Btimes 0.006*** (3.05) 0.002*** (3.00) 0.005* (1.83) Ipo_year -0.003 (-1.35) 0.001 (1.23) -0.003 (-1.43) Gaoxin 0.025 (1.32) -0.020*** (-3.89) 0.041 (1.45) YEAR 是 是 是 IND 是 是 是 Cons 0.758***(4.24) 0.023 (0.48) 0.747*** (4.08) Adj R2 0.049 0.059
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表 8 基于政府面临的财政赤字分组的异质性检验
变量 财政赤字大 财政赤字小 First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage (1) (2) (3) (4) Rate Subsidyt+1 Rate Subsidyt+1 Rate -5.241*** (-2.93) -6.376 (-0.73) EP 0.014*** (3.30) 0.006 (0.78) Size 0.003 (0.75) -0.082*** (-3.98) 0.004 (1.09) -0.081** (-2.08) Growth 0.010** (2.05) -0.003 (-0.08) 0.015*** (2.57) 0.026 (0.18) Lev -0.110*** (-5.72) -0.055 (-0.24) -0.127*** (-7.41) -0.190 (-0.17) Magratio 0.020 (0.41) 0.344 (1.19) -0.028 (-0.91) -0.102 (-0.31) Btimes 0.002*** (2.90) 0.012* (1.95) 0.001 (1.40) 0.007 (0.56) Ipo_year 0.001 (0.94) 0.007 (1.31) 0.001 (1.34) 0.011 (1.11) Gaoxin -0.029*** (-4.04) -0.076 (-1.21) -0.012 (-1.48) -0.038 (-0.32) YEAR 是 是 是 是 IND 是 是 是 是 Cons 0.033 (0.48) 2.339*** (5.74) 0.060 (0.73) 2.489*** (3.12) N 1 600 1 600 1 599 1 599 Kleibergen-Paap LM 10.231*** 0.657 Kleibergen-Paap F值 10.258 0.647
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表 9 企业行为与行业表现相悖的异质性检验
变量 异质性强 异质性弱 First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage (1) (2) (3) (4) Rate Subsidyt+1 Rate Subsidyt+1 Rate -4.446*** (-3.03) -103.070 (-0.37) EP 0.019*** (3.46) 0.001 (0.37) Size 0.005 (1.07) -0.087*** (-3.68) 0.001 (0.96) 0.024 (0.09) Growth 0.021*** (2.96) 0.013 (0.28) 0.000 (0.23) 0.003 (0.02) Lev -0.206*** (-8.65) -0.282 (-0.88) -0.010** (-2.14) -0.684 (-0.24) Magratio -0.031 (-0.60) -0.043 (-0.16) -0.000 (-0.10) -0.008 (-0.01) Btimes 0.003*** (2.62) 0.008 (1.23) 0.000* (1.84) 0.041 (0.38) Ipo_year 0.001 (0.58) 0.006 (1.04) 0.000* (1.67) 0.038 (0.38) Gaoxin -0.036*** (-3.77) -0.046 (-0.68) 0.001 (0.19) 0.084 (0.34) YEAR 是 是 是 是 IND 是 是 是 是 Cons 0.039 (0.43) 2.586*** (5.62) 0.051*** (2.67) 6.777 (0.48) N 1 596 1 596 1 603 1 603 Kleibergen-Paap LM 11.662*** 0.114 Kleibergen-Paap F值 11.744 0.112
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表 10 企业行为与盈利能力相悖的异质性检验
变量 经营状况好 经营状况差 First Stage Second Stage First Stage Second Stage (1) (2) (3) (4) Rate Subsidyt+1 Rate Subsidyt+1 Rate 30.554 (0.21) -4.706*** (-3.27) EP -0.001 (-0.21) 0.019*** (4.06) Size 0.002 (0.56) -0.048 (-0.18) -0.031*** (-6.32) -0.208*** (-3.98) Growth 0.003 (1.08) -0.114 (-0.22) 0.018** (2.04) -0.052 (-0.89) Lev -0.052*** (-3.72) 1.793 (0.23) -0.102*** (-4.75) 0.119 (0.63) Magratio 0.041 (1.24) -1.262 (-0.21) -0.025 (-0.66) -0.009 (-0.04) Btimes 0.001*** (2.58) -0.043 (-0.21) 0.002 (1.45) 0.009 (1.37) Ipo_year 0.002*** (2.93) -0.059 (-0.22) 0.000 (0.17) 0.012** (2.12) Gaoxin -0.023*** (-4.58) 0.736 (0.21) -0.012 (-1.29) 0.060 (1.08) YEAR 是 是 是 是 IND 是 是 是 是 Cons 0.054 (0.85) -1.657 (-0.20) 0.759*** (7.43) 5.015*** (4.15) N 1 596 1 596 1 603 1 603 Kleibergen-Paap LM 0.043 15.527*** Kleibergen-Paap F值 0.042 15.869
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表 11 基于声誉的中介机制检验
变量 (1) (2) (3) Subsidyt+1 Reputation Subsidyt+1 Rate -0.480*** (-7.55) -0.020*** (-2.96) -0.470*** (-7.40) Reputation 0.470*** (2.85) Size -0.100*** (-11.91) -0.006*** (-6.76) -0.098*** (-11.49) Growth -0.052*** (-3.91) -0.001 (-0.46) -0.051*** (-3.89) Lev 0.513*** (11.26) -0.001 (-0.16) 0.513*** (11.28) Magratio 0.079 (0.86) -0.004 (-0.36) 0.080 (0.88) Btimes 0.001 (0.46) 0.001*** (5.64) 0.000 (0.17) Ipo_year 0.006*** (2.89) 0.001** (2.27) 0.006*** (2.78) Gaoxin 0.038** (2.07) -0.003 (-1.40) 0.040** (2.14) YEAR 是 是 是 IND 是 是 是 Cons 1.855*** (9.76) 0.157*** (7.65) 1.782*** (9.30) Adj R2 0.115 0.113 0.117
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表 12 基于混合所有制改革的进一步讨论
变量 First Stage Second Stage (1)Rate (2)Rate×(Hungai1)2 (3)Subsidyt+1 Rate -6.940*** (-3.04) Rate×(Hungai1)2 130.507** (2.29) EP 0.010*** (3.39) 0.000 (1.47) EP×(Hungai1)2 1.273*** (3.04) 0.077*** (29.74) Hungai1 -0.040 (-0.25) 0.008*** (8.38) -0.405 (-0.32) (Hungai1)2 -0.696 (-0.97) -0.086*** (-19.48) 3.652 (0.60) Size 0.004* (1.68) 0.000** (2.16) -0.077*** (-3.95) Growth 0.012*** (3.12) 0.000** (2.18) 0.012 (0.34) Lev -0.122*** (-9.73) -0.000 (-1.57) -0.246 (-0.86) Magratio -0.013 (-0.52) 0.000 (0.29) -0.004 (-0.02) Btimes 0.002*** (2.85) -0.000** (-2.54) 0.011** (2.05) Ipo_year 0.001 (1.33) -0.000 (-1.24) 0.009** (1.99) Gaoxin -0.021*** (-4.01) -0.000* (-1.67) -0.081 (-1.42) YEAR 是 是 是 IND 是 是 是 Cons 0.026 (0.52) -0.001 (-1.61) 2.438*** (6.69) Kleibergen-Paap LM 9.593*** Kleibergen-Paap F值 4.831 变量 First Stage Second Stage (1)Rate (2)Rate×(Hungai2)2 (3)Subsidyt+1 Rate -6.931*** (-3.05) Rate×(Hungai2)2 134.550** (2.36) EP 0.010*** (3.39) 0.000 (1.34) EP×(Hungai2)2 1.329*** (3.08) 0.079*** (31.32) Hungai2 0.033 (0.18) 0.011*** (9.99) 0.132 (0.10) (Hungai2)2 -1.049 (-1.29) -0.100*** (-21.11) 1.878 (0.28) Size 0.004* (1.66) 0.000** (2.19) -0.077*** (-3.99) Growth 0.011*** (3.08) 0.000** (2.39) 0.011 (0.32) Lev -0.122*** (-9.70) -0.001 (-1.47) -0.245 (-0.86) Magratio -0.013 (-0.52) 0.000 (0.23) -0.002 (-0.01) Btimes 0.002*** (2.84) -0.000*** (-2.77) 0.011** (2.06) Ipo_year 0.001 (1.30) -0.000 (-1.43) 0.009** (1.97) Gaoxin -0.021*** (-4.03) -0.000 (-1.38) -0.082 (-1.45) YEAR 是 是 是 IND 是 是 是 Cons 0.027 (0.54) -0.001 (-1.58) 2.439*** (6.70) Kleibergen-Paap LM 9.640*** Kleibergen-Paap F值 4.857
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