The Effect of Communication and Action on Monetary Policy Expectation Management: Empirical Evidence from Commercial Banks
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摘要: 科学合理的货币政策预期管理是坚持稳中求进工作总基调的重要保障。基于货币政策预期管理调控机理的系统分析，构造指数探究货币政策预期管理中“沟通”和“行动”的实际调控效应。研究发现：货币政策预期管理的“沟通”和“行动”两类工具都能对银行信贷投放产生显著正向影响；言行一致有助于增强货币政策预期管理的调控效应，言行不一致则严重削弱“行动”的调控效应；中国人民银行对预期管理的重视、提升预期管理频率、提醒公众关注预期信号等，均能够显著提升预期管理的调控效应；经济增长高速阶段“行动”类工具效应较强，经济增长减速阶段“沟通”类工具效应较强；预期管理的“行动”类工具对各类型商业银行均具有显著影响，“沟通”类工具则未能有效影响地方法人银行的信贷投放。中央银行应逐步完善预期管理的政策框架，注重保持言行一致，培养公众敏感性，加大沟通力度，关注市场信号反馈，以有效应对当前预期转弱的压力。Abstract: Scientificmonetary policy expectation management is an important guarantee for adhering to the principle of pursuing progress while ensuring stability. Based on the systematic analysis of the regulation mechanism of monetary policy expectation management, this paper constructs indexes to explore the actual regulation effect of "communication" and "action" in monetary policy expectation management. The findings show that both "communication" and "action" tools can have a significant positive impact on bank credit extension; consistency of communications and actions helps to enhance the regulatory effect of monetary policy expection management, while inconsistency of communications and actions seriously weakens the regulatory effect of "action"; the People's Bank of China's attention to expectation management, increasing the frequency of expectation management and reminding the public to pay attention to expectation signals can significantly improve the regulation effect of expectation management; the effect of "action" is strong in high growth period, but the "communication" is strong in low growth period; the "action" tools of expected management have a significant impact on all types of commercial banks, while the "communication" tools fail to affect the credit extension of local corporate banks. The central bank should gradually improve the policy framework of expectation management, pay attention to keeping communications consistent with actions, cultivate public sensitivity, strengthen communication, pay attention to market signal feedback, so as to effectively deal with the pressure of expectation weakening.
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Key words:
- monetary policy /
- expectation management /
- communication /
- action /
- bank credit
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表 1 中国人民银行沟通措辞和赋值
经济增长 物价水平 货币信贷环境 政策基调 赋值 衰退 通货紧缩 增长过慢 宽松 1.0 增长有所放缓 价格下行压力 增长偏慢 适度宽松 0.5 平稳健康 物价稳定 适度增长 稳健、中性 0.0 经济增长过快 通货膨胀压力 增长偏快 适度紧缩 -0.5 经济过热 价格过快上涨 增长过快 紧缩 -1.0 注：资料来源于《货币政策执行报告》以及王宇伟等(2019)[20]的研究。实际操作中通过手工筛选的方式，将相近措辞也纳入统计范围。 
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表 2 变量设计
变量符号 变量名称 定义 Time 预期管理进程 2005年至2010年=0，2011年至2019年=1 CI 央行沟通指数 根据《货币政策执行报告》和人行网站新闻筛选关键词自行测算 AI 实际行动指数 根据准备金率、存贷款利率和SLF利率调整情况自行测算 YXYZ 是否言行一致 行动指数与沟通指数同方向=1，行动指数与沟通指数不同方向=0 Dev 言行偏离程度 央行沟通指数和实际行动指数的标准化之差 Number 央行沟通频数 中国人民银行开展沟通的次数 Word “预期管理”词频 中国人民银行沟通中提及“预期管理”相关词汇的词频 Bank 银行类型 大型国有商业银行=1，股份制商业银行=2，地方法人银行=3 Loan 银行信贷规模 银行贷款规模的自然对数 Asset 银行规模 银行总资产的自然对数 Tcp 资本情况 资本充足率 IPO 上市情况 上市前=0，上市后=1 GDP 经济增速 国民生产总值增长率 CPI 通货膨胀 居民消费价格指数-100
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表 3 变量描述性统计
变量 均值 标准差 最小值 最大值 央行沟通指数(CI) 1.680 8 3.339 6 -4.647 7 11.465 6 实际行动指数(AI) -0.096 8 0.684 2 -1.75 0.914 3 言行偏离程度(Dev) 0.880 4 0.716 6 0.026 5 2.696 6 央行沟通频数(Number) 17.6 9.744 7 4 34 “预期管理”词频(Word) 0.005 8 0.004 8 -9.238 7 9.503 9 银行信贷规模(Loan) 12.472 4 1.998 4 8.609 5 16.637 1 银行规模(Asset) 13.195 6 1.971 3 9.401 0 17.220 3 资本情况(Tcp) 12.068 3 2.953 1 -11.14 30.14 上市情况(IPO) 0.458 8 0.498 7 0 1 经济增长率(GDP) 8.94 2.341 1 6.1 14.2 通货膨胀率(CPI) 2.613 3 1.640 6 -0.7 5.9
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表 4 央行沟通、实际行动与银行信贷投放的响应结果
解释变量 仅央行沟通 央行沟通+实际行动 Pool FE RE Pool FE RE CIt-1 0.021 0***
(0.006 9)0.023 1***
(0.007 6)0.021 7***
(0.002 6)0.018 0**
(0.008 6)0.019 9**
(0.009 8)0.027 2***
(0.002 3)AIt-1 0.014 2***
(0.002 3)0.024 5***
(0.007 7)0.014 1**
(0.006 9)Loani, t-1 0.603 1***
(0.173 2)0.378 3***
(0.134 0)0.539 4***
(0.041 4)0.602 3***
(0.173 1)0.373 9***
(0.128 0)0.538 6***
(0.041 2)Asseti, t-1 0.391 2**
(0.177 1)0.505 3***
(0.133 5)0.452 6***
(0.041 4)0.392 1**
(0.178 3)0.500 1***
(0.128 2)0.453 5***
(0.041 4)Tcpi, t-1 0.002 1
(0.001 8)0.003 5*
(0.001 9)0.003 7
(0.002 9)0.002 1
(0.001 8)0.003 2
(0.002 0)0.003 8
(0.002 9)IPOi, t 0.018 4
(0.023 3)0.001 3
(0.028 4)0.016 5
(0.024 8)0.018 6
(0.023 1)-0.001 0
(0.028 4)0.016 8
(0.024 8)GDPt 0.028 3***
(0.008 4)-0.001 0
(0.007 8)0.030 0***
(0.004 2)0.027 6***
(0.008 4)-0.003 0
(0.007 7)0.029 4***
(0.004 2)CPIt -0.013 4***
(0.002 6)-0.009 5***
(0.002 4)-0.013 1***
(0.004 4)-0.017 0***
(0.004 2)-0.002 9
(0.003 1)-0.016 7***
(0.006 2)constant -0.273 6
(0.267 2)1.242 3***
(0.340 1)-0.317 5**
(0.130 0)-0.264 3
(0.268 2)1.387 1***
(0.335 1)-0.313 0**
(0.130 0)N 476 476 476 476 476 476 R2 0.993 0.963 0.993 0.963 F 2257.44
(0.00)2012.14
(0.00)LM 6.58
(0.00)6.61
(0.00)Hausman 73.62
(0.00)74.57
(0.00)注：各变量回归系数下方( )中的数字为标准差，各种检验( )中的数字为相应的P值；***、**和*分别表示在1%、5%及10%的显著性水平上通过检验。下表同。
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表 5 言行偏离程度的影响
解释变量 言行一致 言行不一 全样本 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) CIt-1 0.024 8**
(0.012 4)0.023 3**
(0.011 3)0.020 1
(0.027 2)0.020 1
(0.027 2)0.016 6**
(0.007 3)0.024 2**
(0.012 0)AIt-1 0.050 7***
(0.015 1)0.073 6
(0.073 9)0.021 2*
(0.012 6)0.015 4**
(0.007 6)Devt-1 0.016 8*
(0.009 6)0.012 0*
(0.007 1)0.012 4
(0.013 1)CIt-1×Devt-1 0.001 1
(0.001 5)0.003 4
(0.038 6)AIt-1×Devt-1 -0.004 1**
(0.001 9)-0.004 5**
(0.002 2)Loani, t-1 0.324 3**
(0.119 2)0.315 2***
(0.109 3)1.371 1**
(0.601 3)1.371 5**
(0.601 3)0.377 3***
(0.133 1)0.365 3***
(0.119 2)0.364 6***
(0.118 1)Asseti, t-1 0.557 3***
(0.105 1)0.536 3***
(0.090 6)-0.064 4
(0.252 2)-0.065 4
(0.252 1)0.517 3***
(0.134 1)0.506 6***
(0.130 2)0.505 0***
(0.131 0)Tcpi, t-1 -0.000 6
(0.002 3)-0.000 8
(0.002 2)0.018 7*
(0.010 2)0.018 7*
(0.010 2)0.003 1
(0.002 1)0.002 7
(0.002 2)0.002 8
(0.002 1)IPOi, t 0.014 2
(0.029 6)0.006 1
(0.028 9)-0.031 0
(0.055 1)-0.031 0
(0.055 1)0.000 1
(0.028 7)-0.002 2
(0.028 6)-0.002 3
(0.028 0)GDPt -0.005 1
(0.006 4)-0.011 9*
(0.006 3)0.157 1
(0.149 0)0.157 1
(0.149 0)0.001 4
(0.009 2)-0.007 0
(0.012 3)-0.007 2
(0.014 0)CPIt -0.001 7
(0.005 0)0.010 0
(0.006 9)-0.030 3**
(0.011 3)-0.030 3**
(0.011 3)-0.011 8***
(0.002 9)-0.000 8
(0.006 1)-0.000 6
(0.007 1)constant 1.294 2***
(0.309 1)1.732 3***
(0.338 5)-4.982 3
(5.561 2)-4.971 2
(5.165 8)1.098 6***
(0.384 0)1.448 1***
(0.461 3)1.454 6***
(0.510 0)N 340 340 136 136 476 476 476 R2 0.983 0.984 0.915 0.915 0.963 0.963 0.963
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表 6 预期管理阶段的影响
解释变量 2005—2010
(1)2011—2019
(2)2005—2019
(3)解释变量 2005—2010
(4)2011—2019
(5)CIt-1 0.002 9
(0.002 9)0.029 7*
(0.016 3)0.020 5*
(0.011 7)CIt-1 0.056 6
(0.163 2)0.026 0**
(0.013 3)AIt-1 0.108 8***
(0.035 2)0.031 3***
(0.009 9)0.070 7***
(0.016 6)AIt-1 0.108 5***
(0.0353)0.020 9**
(0.008 4)Time 0.104 5***
(0.034 1)Devt-1 0.014 5
(0.011 1)0.050 3
(0.054 0)CIt-1×Time 0.016 1**
(0.007 7)CIt-1×Devt-1 -0.008 8**
(0.003 8)0.018 7
(0.037 6)AIt-1×Time -0.056 0***
(0.019 1)AIt-1×Devt-1 -0.068 7
(0.368 2)-0.192 2*
(0.113 8)Loani, t-1 0.221 2
(0.148 0)0.268 3*
(0.141 6)0.355 5***
(0.127 1)Loani, t-1 0.221 3
(0.148 2)0.276 6**
(0.135 1)Asseti, t-1 0.505 3***
(0.159 2)0.649 8***
(0.178 0)0.540 5***
(0.134 1)Asseti, t-1 0.505 6***
(0.159 4)0.645 5***
(0.159 1)Tcpi, t-1 -0.002 7
(0.002 6)0.012 1***
(0.003 0)0.001 8
(0.002 6)Tcpi, t-1 -0.002 7
(0.002 6)0.013 1***
(0.003 5)IPOi, t 0.026 6
(0.059 5)-0.047 7
(0.046 7)-0.010 2
(0.030 9)IPOi, t 0.026 6
(0.059 5)-0.048 8
(0.046 1)GDPt -0.030 1**
(0.011 3)-0.067 7***
(0.022 1)-0.015 2*
(0.008 6)GDPt -0.031 5**
(0.012 2)-0.096 5**
(0.037 7)CPIt 0.020 8
(0.012 4)0.041 0***
(0.007 1)0.010 2*
(0.005 1)CPIt 0.020 5
(0.012 4)0.004 0
(0.048 9)constant 3.416 2***
(1.037 3)0.985 6
(0.953 1)1.261 5***
(0.392 0)constant 3.433 4***
(1.051 1)1.197 3
(0.792 2)N 170 306 476 N 170 306 R2 0.919 0.892 0.964 R2 0.919 0.893
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表 7 央行沟通方式的影响
解释变量 增加沟通频率 解释变量 强调预期管理 央行沟通
(1)沟通+行动
(2)央行沟通
(3)沟通+行动
(4)CIt-1 0.013 2* (0.007 8) 0.013 7* (0.007 9) CIt-1 0.015 8* (0.009 1) 0.014 5* (0.008 2) AIt-1 0.017 2* (0.008 8) AIt-1 0.022 6**(0.010 6) Numbert-1 0.032 7* (0.019 2) 0.030 9* (0.017 0) Wordt-1 6.006 2*** (0.987 1) 5.844 3*** (1.340 0) CIt-1×Numbert-1 0.010 6*** (0.003 3) 0.009 9*** (0.003 4) CIt-1×Wordt-1 0.664 3* (0.344 2) 0.672 7* (0.347 1) Loani, t-1 0.372 2*** (0.127 1) 0.369 3*** (0.123 2) Loani, t-1 0.369 3*** (0.124 5) 0.368 7*** (0.124 1) Asseti, t-1 0.489 3*** (0.114 2) 0.487 6*** (0.113 1) Asseti, t-1 0.502 5***(0.125 5) 0.501 9*** (0.125 4) Tcpi, t-1 0.002 7 (0.002 0) 0.002 5 (0.002 1) Tcpi, t-1 0.003 2 (0.002 2) 0.003 2 (0.002 2) IPOi, t 0.005 2 (0.027 5) 0.003 3 (0.027 1) IPOi, t 0.001 9 (0.029 0) 0.001 7 (0.028 9) GDPt 0.003 5 (0.009 7) 0.001 7 (0.010 0) GDPt 0.002 5 (0.008 2) 0.002 3 (0.008 1) CPIt -0.009 9*** (0.003 0) -0.005 3 (0.004 0) CPIt -0.013 1*** (0.002 7) -0.012 4** (0.004 5) constant 1.465 4*** (0.321 2) 1.551 6*** (0.317 0) constant 1.366 8*** (0.359 9) 1.3768*** (0.351 1) N 476 476 N 476 476 R2 0.964 0.964 R2 0.964 0.964
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表 8 不同经济周期的影响
解释变量 以银行业景气指数划分周期 以现实经济运行划分周期 高速期
(1)减速期
(2)高速期
(3)减速期
(4)CIt-1 -0.015 5***(0.004 9) 0.014 5**(0.006 2) 0.018 2(0.062 4) 0.031 3***(0.009 9) AIt-1 0.228 0***(0.059 1) -0.047 8(0.042 9) 0.128 8***(0.052 6) 0.034 9(0.032 9) Loani, t-1 0.311 4***(0.148 1) 0.256 1**(0.102 0) 0.220 6(0.148 2) 0.268 8*(0.141 5) Asseti, t-1 0.415 3***(0.114 2) 0.680 8***(0.182 2) 0.505 1***(0.158 6) 0.649 1***(0.178 2) Tcpi, t-1 0.002 7(0.002 8) 0.008 1*(0.004 7) -0.002 7(0.002 6) 0.012 1***(0.003 0) IPOi, t 0.032 7* (0.017 6) -0.022 4(0.057 9) 0.026 6(0.059 5) -0.047 7(0.046 7) GDPt 0.120 3***(0.029 9) 0.031 7(0.034 9) -0.077 4**(0.036 7) -0.067 7***(0.022 1) CPIt 0.022 4***(0.011 5) 0.131 6*(0.052 0) 0.007 4(0.007 0) 0.041 0***(0.007 2) constant 1.020 1(0.797 9) 0.163 5(1.726 1) 3.940 2***(1.344 8) 0.985 2(0.953 7) N 238 238 170 306 R2 0.961 0.951 0.919 0.892
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表 9 不同性质银行的响应
解释变量 大型国有银行 股份制商业银行 地方法人银行 央行沟通 沟通+行动 央行沟通 沟通+行动 央行沟通 沟通+行动 CIt-1 0.038 0*
(0.017 0)0.025 5*
(0.013 1)0.019 1*
(0.010 8)0.022 3*
(0.013 5)0.031 9
(0.082 9)0.024 4
(0.072 3)AIt-1 0.025 7***
(0.004 9)0.055 9**
(0.027 8)0.017 5*
(0.010 3)Loani, t-1 0.611 2***
(0.120 2)0.594 3***
(0.119 0)0.206 5**
(0.067 3)0.206 6**
(0.068 6)0.873 8***
(0.027 0)0.872 9***
(0.030 9)Asseti, t-1 0.293 8
(0.179 0)0.291 9
(0.179 1)0.672 5***
(0.136 6)0.675 7***
(0.146 0)0.115 9***
(0.037 1)0.115 8***
(0.037 4)Tcpi, t-1 0.008 4
(0.007 0)0.006 1
(0.007 2)0.006 8***
(0.001 2)0.006 8***
(0.001 1)0.004 8*
(0.002 7)0.004 8
(0.002 8)IPOi, t 0.001 8
(0.021 5)0.000 3
(0.022 3)-0.008 7
(0.071 1)-0.008 4
(0.069 8)0.019 0
(0.026 8)0.018 9
(0.026 7)GDPt -0.005 2
(0.010 5)-0.009 2
(0.010 8)0.000 9
(0.025 2)0.001 4
(0.026 2)0.018 0**
(0.007 1)0.017 8**
(0.007 3)CPIt -0.014 0**
(0.003 2)-0.006 7*
(0.003 0)-0.008 5*
(0.004 6)-0.010 1
(0.010 1)-0.012 5***
(0.003 2)-0.012 1***
(0.003 6)constant 1.375 2
(1.035 2)1.732 3
(1.086 1)1.321 0
(1.308 3)1.284 4
(1.396 0)0.041 3
(0.361 2)0.051 2
(0.380 9)N 70 70 154 154 252 252 R2 0.994 0.994 0.931 0.931 0.990 0.990
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